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DISCRIMINATORY JOB KNOWLEDGE 
TESTS, POLICE PROMOTIONS, AND WHAT 
TITLE VII CAN LEARN FROM TORT LAW 
MARK S. BRODIN* 
Abstract: Nationally, the continued use of selection devices by police de-
partments—such as multiple-choice examinations requiring memorization of 
police manuals—stifles advancement for a disproportionate number of other-
wise qualified minority candidates, and hinders the desired diversification of 
the upper ranks. These exams have little to do with predicting success as a 
sergeant or other police supervisor. The traditional Title VII approach, a dis-
parate impact challenge, has proven unsatisfactory given the relative ease with 
which the exams can be “content validated” in court. This Article proposes a 
new approach familiar to tort lawyers—the inference of intent from actions 
taken with foreseeable or inevitable consequences. When a police agency rou-
tinely administers multiple-choice exams, fully aware of the exclusionary im-
pact on minorities, the results can no longer be deemed “unintentional,” and 
the matter should be treated as disparate treatment. Significantly, each U.S. 
Department of Justice report following the incidents of police killings of un-
armed civilians in Ferguson, Chicago, Baltimore, and elsewhere, found poor 
supervision of line officers and lack of diversity in supervisory positions to be 
major contributing factors to these tragedies. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, landmark legislation designed to open employment opportunities to 
minorities and women, is uniquely positioned to address the problem. But to 
do so, courts must disentangle these litigations from the hyper-technical world 
of test validation, and instead apply a common-sense definition of intentional 
discrimination as applied in tort litigation. 
[W]hat the Court has said to employers . . . is that while you still can’t 
commit blatant, obvious acts of discrimination against minorities and 
women, if you are sophisticated and discreet about it, we will look the 
other way. You cannot hang a “no blacks allowed” sign on your door, 
but if you’re clever and come up with a standardized test or some other 
superficially neutral ruse that achieves exactly the same result, no one 
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will stand in your way. You can be a bigot, in other words, so long as 
you are a kind and gentle one.1 
It is clear that the employers around the country are increasingly so-
phisticated in the validation of tests . . . We do not see, however, compa-
rable evidence that validated tests have in fact gotten black and brown 
bodies, or for that matter, females into places as a result of the valida-
tion of those tests. In other words, we do not see the kind of causal rela-
tion that I think, when the great — and I regard it as a great — new en-
forcement tool [Title VII] was discovered some years ago, we do not see 
quite the causal relationship we had expected to see . . . So if the com-
mission, in effect, says to employers, as long as you validate your tests 
we’re really not concerned about you anymore . . . it is saying that the 
presence of real people who are not in the work force, is not as im-
portant as making sure that the tests have been validated.2 
Today, government employers as well as unions continue to extol the use 
of written merit exams as the best way to hire the most “qualified” per-
sons for the job, notwithstanding the lack of evidence to support this. 
While the intent to discriminate may be absent, the exams continue to 
adversely affect persons of color in both police and fire departments.3 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s, as a staff lawyer with the Boston Lawyers’ Committee 
for Civil Rights,4 I worked on several cases challenging the use of multiple-
choice “job-knowledge” examinations for the promotion of public safety 
officers. They all fit a familiar pattern—near total exclusion of minority 
applicants, and no evidence showing that the devices could meaningfully 
predict successful job performance as a supervisor. Rather, these closed-
book tests screen for the ability to memorize sections of police manuals,5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 136 CONG. REC. 22,006 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (debate over the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991). 
 2 Barbara Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 
SUP. CT. REV. 17, 40 n.62. (quoting comments of Chairwoman Eleanor H. Norton at the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission Meeting on December 22, 1977). 
 3 Norma M. Riccucci & Margaret Riccardelli, The Use of Written Exams in Police and Fire 
Departments: Implications for Social Diversity, 35 REV. OF PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 352, 353–54 
(2015). 
 4 I had the pleasure to work with fellow Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (“LCCR”) staff 
lawyers Judy Tracy (then Bernstein) and Alan Jay Rom. 
 5 The questions are typically drawn from manuals on a reading list provided to test-takers in 
advance of the exams. See, e.g., Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 109–10 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(Lopez II), aff’g No. 07-11693-GAO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *37 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 
2014) (Lopez I). An example of the approach of these tests may be found in an announcement 
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and candidates for key supervisory positions requiring varied skills, abili-
ties, and personal qualities are thus reduced to a single score. Although these 
cases often ended in consent decrees in which the appointing authorities 
agreed to validate subsequent exams (i.e., demonstrate that they reliably pre-
dict job performance),6 such commitments have very rarely been honored.7 
These second-generation discrimination cases followed earlier ones 
that focused on entry-level hiring. Some of the minority preference orders 
that resulted are still in effect; others have expired as the department’s mi-
nority representation at the patrol officer-level reached parity with the 
community’s population.8 
There are currently dozens of challenges to police promotional practic-
es in Massachusetts.9 Two recent cases come to opposite results. The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Lopez v. City of Lawrence concluded that the 
statewide multiple-choice test for promotion to sergeant was “minimally 
valid,” “albeit not by much,” thus countering its undisputed exclusionary 
effect on minorities.10 In contrast in Smith v. City of Boston, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts held that virtually the same test, 
used to select and rank candidates for promotion to lieutenant, violated Title 
                                                                                                                           
directing applicants to the portions of the manuals they are expected to study and, in effect, memo-
rize. See infra Appendix A, also available at https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/
law-review-content/BCLR/59-7/brodin-appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUF8-TPRE]. 
 6 See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Afro-American Police v. Bos. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 18, 20 (1st 
Cir. 1992).  
 7 As of 1998, only one such exam had been validated as “fair.” See Bos. Police Superior Of-
ficers Fed’n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1998). The Massachusetts experience is 
not unique. See Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Despite the 
City’s repeated assurances of adopting race-neutral promotional processes, . . . as of the mid-
1990s, ‘incredibly, the City continue[d] to make police and fire department promotions according 
to procedures that have not been validated as racially neutral.’” (quoting Aiken v. City of Mem-
phis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1164 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc)). 
 8 See NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1022 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding multiple-choice ex-
ams for selection of firefighters discriminatory and non-job related); Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. 
Supp. 930, 943 (D. Mass. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), on re-
mand, 365 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1973) (holding a civil service examination discriminatory and 
non-job related for police officers). 
 9 See generally Sullivan v. City of Springfield, 555 F. Supp. 2d 246, 248–50 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(recounting the long history in Massachusetts); Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 160 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (finding that certain promotions of minorities did not violate equal protection); Bos. 
Police Superior Officers Fed’n, 147 F.3d at 13 (challenging a finding that the promotional exam 
was not fair); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (addressing an equal protection 
challenge to promotional practices in Massachusetts); Tatum v. City of Worcester Police Dep’t, 
No. 94-SEM-0589, 2006 WL 662739, at *4 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim. Mar. 6, 2006) (not-
ing that Boston has a “problematic record in promoting minorities over a significant period of 
time”). 
 10 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 114. 
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VII as it rejected minority candidates at a disproportionate rate and could 
not be validated as predictive of job performance.11 
When I was approached about contributing to an amicus brief on be-
half of the plaintiffs in Lopez, I was quite surprised to learn that police de-
partments were still relying on selection devices that predictably produced 
nearly all white supervisory ranks. This form of screening had long been 
discredited by courts12 and experts.13 The City of Boston itself acknowl-
edged the illegality of its selection processes in a 2002 brief to the First Cir-
cuit14 (defending its decision to deviate from strict rank order promotions in 
order to reach additional minority candidates): 
  The Boston Police Department has a long history of discrim-
ination in its hiring and promotional practices, a history well doc-
umented in a number of decisions of this Court and of the District 
Court. There was undisputed evidence before the District Court 
that despite the best efforts of the Department’s current leader-
ship, the effects of the Department’s past discrimination contin-
ued to be felt through the period at issue, including a continuing 
gross statistical disparity between the selection percentage of 
black officers and the selection percentage of white officers. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 177 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d on reconsideration, 267 F. Supp. 3d 325 
(D. Mass. 2017). 
 12 See, e.g., Nash v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (11th Cir. 1988), 
vacated by 490 U.S. 1103 (1989), op. reinstated on remand, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The 
best that can be said of the City’s [multiple-choice] test based on the evidence at trial was that it 
may have been valid with respect to reading materials provided to the applicants. This is immate-
rial, however, to whether the content of the questions related to the performance of the job [of fire 
lieutenant].”); Vulcan Pioneers v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 625 F. Supp. 527, 539 (D.N.J. 1985), 
aff’d, 832 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that multiple-choice tests are “more probative of the 
test-taker’s ability to recall what a particular text stated on a given topic than of his firefighting or 
supervisory knowledge or abilities”). 
 13 See, e.g., THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 57–58 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips eds., 1998) (discussing how the selection devices used hurt minorities); Winfred Arthur, 
Jr. et al., Multiple-Choice and Constructed Response Tests of Ability: Race-Based Subgroup Per-
formance Differences on Alternative Paper-and-Pencil Test Formats, 55 PERS. PSYCHOL. 985, 
991–92 (2002) (exploring the differences in testing scores caused by the types of exams employed 
by many police departments); George C. Thornton III & David M. Morris, The Application of 
Assessment Center Technology to the Evaluation of Personnel Records, 30 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 55, 
56 (2001) (“The written examination certainly provides the best way to evaluate whether a candi-
date knows the rules of the organization and conceptual principles of policing. That information is 
a basic, necessary starting point for good supervision, but it is not sufficient for success in police 
administration and leadership.”); Neal Schmidt et al., Adverse Impact and Predictive Efficiency of 
Various Predictor Combinations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 719, 719–29 (1997) (discrediting the 
selection devices used by many police departments). 
 14 See generally Brief of Appellee the City of Boston, Cotter, 323 F.3d 160 (Nos. 02-1404, 
02-1458, 02-1459), 2002 WL 34217275. 
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Moreover, there was undisputed evidence that the 1996 examina-
tion on which the promotions were based was not validated and 
had an adverse impact on African-American officers taking the 
test.  
. . . .  
  It is also undisputed that the Commissioner had real and le-
gitimate concerns that . . . individual minority officers affected by 
the promotional process, or others would bring suit against the 
City and the Department if promotions were made in strict rank 
order. Given the undisputed evidence of adverse impact, such liti-
gation would have been meritorious.15 
Continued reliance (à la Ground Hog Day)16 upon rote memory tests 
has resulted in the severe underrepresentation of minorities in supervisory 
ranks in departments like Boston, where less than one-fifth of such posi-
tions are filled by minorities.17 Chicago too has what one federal judge de-
scribed as a “tortured history of challenges to the CPD’s promotion pro-
cesses [primarily exams] stretch[ing] back as far as 1971.”18 And, in appar-
ent frustration, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote of the Memphis 
Police Department: 
The City’s promotional processes have engendered controversy 
for nearly forty years, prompting numerous lawsuits alleging ra-
cial and gender discrimination by such parties as the United 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Id. This despite a Consent Decree entered in 1980 and extended to the 1990s requiring that 
promotional examinations be validated according to the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines (29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.1 (2012)). See Mass. Ass’n of Afro-American Police, 780 F.2d at 6. 
 16 See generally GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993) (a 1993 movie starring Bill 
Murray and Andie MacDowell, where the main character wakes up each day only to experience an 
exact repetition of the day before). 
 17 Isaiah Thompson, Boston Police Diversity Hitting Old Roadblocks: Promotions, WGBH (July 
12, 2016), https://news.wgbh.org/2016/07/12/local-news/boston-police-diversity-efforts-hitting-old-
roadblock-promotions [https://perma.cc/F9SF-Q3FW]. The percentage of minorities in Massachu-
setts serving as sergeant varies between one-half and one-third their percentage in the entry-level 
officer ranks. See Brief of Amici Curiae Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Of-
ficers, NAACP-New England Area Conference, Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts & Pro-
fessor Mark Brodin in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Lopez II, 823 F.3d 102 (No. 14-1952), 
2015 WL 1754366 (presenting statistics regarding the presence of minorities in different supervi-
sory roles throughout Massachusetts). The City of Worcester did not promote a minority to ser-
geant until 2001, and only four of fifty-two were promoted after. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of 
Fact & Rulings of Law at 7, Lopez I, No. 07-11693-GAO. 
 18 Barnhill v. Chi. Police Dep’t, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The history began 
with a ruling in 1976 that the sergeant’s exam discriminated against African-Americans, Hispan-
ics, and women. United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see also 
Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 307 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining the history of remedial 
measures in Chicago since 1976). 
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States Department of Justice, the Afro-American Police Associa-
tion, and white and minority officers. . . . Despite the City’s re-
peated assurances of adopting race-neutral promotional processes, 
we observed that, as of the mid-1990s, “incredibly, the City con-
tinue[d] to make police and fire department promotions according 
to procedures that have not been validated as racially neutral.”19 
A public administration study confirms that “[w]ritten exams have his-
torically been an obstacle for persons of color,” perhaps “the biggest obstacle 
for police and fire departments to achieve social diversity based on race and 
ethnicity.”20 Yet there is little incentive to abandon them, given their low cost 
and ease of administration,21 as well as support from police unions.22 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Johnson, 770 F.3d at 467–68. 
 20 Riccucci & Riccardelli, supra note 3, at 352–53, 363. As to the reasons minorities have typi-
cally underperformed on these exams, the factors include educational and economic inequalities, 
as discussed below in Part IV. There are certainly other obstacles to minority advancement, nota-
bly the absolute veterans’ preference, which has historically benefitted white applicants. and the 
bypassing of minority candidates for questionable reasons. See Jan Ransom, Rejected Boston Po-
lice Candidate Challenges Department’s Hiring Decision, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2017, at A4 (dis-
cussing a potential candidate’s challenge to the hiring process in Boston); Jan Ransom, At BPD, 
Diversity Elusive: Veterans Preference Complicates Hiring, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2017, at A1. 
(discussing how the veteran’s preference has benefitted white applicants and hurt minorities).  
 21 The test consulting firm of Morris & McDaniel emphasizes the cost can be under $20 per 
candidate. See FDLE Approved CJBAT Examinations, MORRIS & MCDANIEL, INC., http://www.
morrisandmcdaniel.com/pages/fdle.htm [https://perma.cc/R74H-4XHU]. Although a Massachu-
setts police department can opt to utilize a custom-made exam, the municipality must bear the 
costs. This amounted to $1.3 million for a 2002 multi-component exam developed for Boston. 
Smith, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 189. Cost is of course no legal justification for continuing practices that 
unfairly exclude protected groups. See Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318, 320 (1987) (noting that cost should not justify testing 
practices that exclude minorities); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 370–71, 371 n.454 (2003) (discussing the use of cost as a justi-
fication for potentially discriminatory testing methods). And, looking simply at out-of-pocket 
expense ignores the hidden costs of promoting individuals who are ill-suited to the position and 
likely to fail. As Susan Strum and Lani Guinier put it: 
Standardized testing is more efficient if efficiency is measured only in the short run 
and in relation to the cost of the enterprise. However, this narrow and static defini-
tion of efficiency is short-sighted and counterproductive. An investment of resources 
up front has the potential to enhance the overall productivity of the organization, 
both by identifying more productive individuals and by enabling the institution to 
adapt better to its changing environment. 
Susan Strum & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Model, 
84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1003 (1996). Moreover, cities may have to spend millions of dollars defend-
ing these exams in court. NYC paid $98 million in back wages and damages to minorities whose 
fire careers were delayed or thwarted. See DAVID GOLDBERG, BLACK FIREFIGHTERS AND THE 
FDNY 2 (Heather Ann Thompson et al. eds., 2017). Budgetary constraints were explicitly a basis 
for the District Court’s upholding of a job knowledge test in the Jackson Mississippi police de-
partment. See Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 742 (S.D. Miss. 2003). 
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Thus, what began decades ago as well-intended civil service reform di-
rected at patronage hiring23 has now calcified into a rigid regime of stand-
ardized testing with little if any connection to the jobs in question and with 
dramatic exclusionary results—“a protected enclave for white ethnics,” as 
one sociologist has described it.24 
The unfortunate consequences of these one-dimensional sorting devic-
es extend far beyond the minority candidates unfairly denied advancement. 
Communities are policed by departments that do not reflect their de-
mographics, and the police may be seen as an occupying force in the neigh-
borhood.25 Former Attorney General Eric Holder responded to the police 
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson by urging that “police forces 
should reflect the diversity of the communities they serve.”26 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Riccucci & Riccardelli, supra note 3, at 359–60 (noting that labor unions may contrib-
ute to the use of the multiple-choice exams); see also GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 7 (discussing 
institutional approval of these types of exam in the FDNY). 
 23 See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASS., THE MERIT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS: A 
STUDY OF PUBLIC PERSONAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 3–5 (1961). 
 24 Kelefa Sanneh, Color Corrected: Is ‘Diversity’ an Improvement on Affirmative Action, or 
the End of it?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 9, 2017, at 74 (quoting Roger Waldinger). The exclusionary 
effect of standardized testing is of course widespread in our society. See, e.g., Stephanie Elbert, 
Diversity Gap at Boston Latin Proving Stubborn, BOS. GLOBE, May 21, 2017, at A1 (explaining 
that minorities are underrepresented at exam schools). Would law schools be comfortable admit-
ting students in rank order of their LSAT scores, without looking at the applicant’s GPA, work 
experience, or personal essay? 
 As observed by Kingsley R. Browne:  
 In applying anti-discrimination laws, the courts must bear in mind that separat-
ing the competent from the incompetent, the highly qualified from the minimally 
qualified, the minimally qualified from the unqualified, all require human judg-
ment. . . . Subjectivity does not imply arbitrariness. . . . [P]eople do not ordinarily 
make decisions in an entirely quantifiable way. . . . Deciding which applicant to hire 
or which employee to promote is necessarily a subjective process. 
Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification of Griggs, a 
Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287, 336–37 
(1993). 
 25 See MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD W. SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS OF 
AN URBAN DILEMMA 75 (2008) (noting the potential effects of police forces that greatly differ in 
ethnicity from their communities); Chris Hayes, Policing the Colony: From the Revolution to 
Ferguson, THE NATION, Apr. 17, 2017, at 16–17 (explaining how the racial differences between 
the community and the police force exacerbated problems in Ferguson). 
 26 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Opinion, From Eric Holder: A Message to the People of Ferguson, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 20, 2014, at A19; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 88–89, 95–96 (Mar. 4, 2015) 
[hereinafter FPD DOJ REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SED-VJZU] 
(identifying lack of diversity as a critical factor in community distrust). For example: 
The Dallas suburb where a white police officer shot and killed a 15-year-old black 
youth as he left a party has a population that is just 20 percent white but a police de-
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It is the thesis of this Article that the promise of the landmark Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of which broadly prohibits workplace discrim-
ination, has been betrayed by courts all too ready to validate dubious testing 
devices27 and to defer to public safety employers who resist less discrimina-
tory and more job-related alternatives.28 Where a discriminatory test is 
found to violate Title VII because it cannot be validated, liability and ap-
propriate remedies follow. But where the test passes the low validation bar, 
even if in a long line of such devices with predictable, virtually inevitable 
exclusion of minorities, current Title VII jurisprudence provides no relief. 
I propose a fresh approach deriving from tort and criminal law princi-
ples—the drawing of an inference of discriminatory intent. All parties in the 
Lopez v. City of Lawrence litigation agreed that the adverse impact of the 
examination was “significant,”29 as it had been on all previous such exams. 
Indeed the District Court acknowledged that “[i]t is widely recognized 
among organizational psychologists, including the four experts who testi-
fied at trial, that minority candidates as a group tend to perform less well 
relative to non-minority candidates on written multiple-choice examinations 
such as [those administered by the Boston Police Department].”30 The Dis-
trict Court further acknowledged that “experience has demonstrated that in 
the aggregate the use of written exams alone tends to have an adverse im-
pact on minority applicants for promotion.”31 This confirms “a consensus in 
the scholarly literature that as a statistical matter, a [test of that kind] is like-
ly to have something approaching one standard deviation of disparate racial 
impact on Blacks.”32 
In tort and criminal law, where actors are deemed to intend the fore-
seeable consequences of their actions,33 such repetitive conduct would like-
ly be considered intentional. Courts have often characterized employment 
                                                                                                                           
partment that’s 80 percent white. . . . “When you have a police force that’s com-
pletely the opposite the makeup of the town, I do think it’s a problem,” [the youth’s 
family lawyers] said.  
Most Officers in Town Where Black Teen Was Slain Are White, BOS. GLOBE, May 4, 2017, at A3. 
 27 See infra notes 157–198 and accompanying text (critiquing the courts’ validation ap-
proach). 
 28 See infra notes 157–198, 233–272 and accompanying text (arguing that the courts’ ap-
proach defers to public safety employers). 
 29 Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *37. 
 30 Id. at *27–28. One expert testified that “there will be continuing adverse impact in the 
promotional decisions that are based on the test scores if the system doesn’t change.” Plaintiffs’ 
Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 17, Lopez I, No. 07-11693-GAO. 
 31 Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *63. 
 32 Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2013). 
 33 See infra notes 233–270 and accompanying text (discussing the potential role intent can 
play in Title VII). 
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discrimination claims as tort actions,34 and this concept had been imported 
into civil rights law in many other contexts.35 Police departments, like Bos-
ton’s, that for years have systematically excluded minorities from promo-
tion by way of job knowledge exams would properly be deemed to have 
intended that result, and meaningful Title VII remedies would follow ac-
cordingly.36 “Evidence of historical discrimination [has long been deemed] 
relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination.”37 
Additionally, Rex v. Smith, the Brides-in-the-Bath case tried at Lon-
don’s Old Bailey in 1915 (and featured in most Evidence casebooks), teach-
es the importance of looking at the bigger picture as opposed to a myopic 
view of discrete events. Mr. Smith would likely have been acquitted of the 
murder of his wife on his plausible defense that she had accidentally 
drowned in their bathtub. The court wisely allowed the jury to learn that 
Smith’s two other wives had also drowned in their baths, “accidentally” as 
Smith would have it. The design that so clearly emerged from the bird’s-eye 
view led to a conviction in a matter of minutes.38 This is the wider perspec-
tive urged here. 
I begin with an exploration of the critical importance of effective po-
lice supervision, and the attributes we seek in a police supervisor, then take 
a close look at job knowledge exams and their severe limitations.39 I follow 
with a survey of the exam validation process and its severe dilution in re-
cent years, using Lopez as a case study in the limits of Title VII test chal-
lenges.40 After discussing the unduly narrow interpretation courts have giv-
en to the less discriminatory alternative requirement, which should result in 
displacement of job knowledge tests with devices that more reliably predict 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See generally L. Camille Hebert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as 
a Dignitary Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345 (2014) (discussing sexual harassment in the workplace as 
a tort); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 
(2016) (considering discrimination under tort law); Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimina-
tion Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 (2014) (using tort law to analyze discrimination claims) 
[hereinafter Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort]; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Em-
ployment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) (looking at discrimination through the lens 
of a tort). 
 35 See infra notes 233–272 and accompanying text. 
 36 As was observed in another context involving race discrimination, “[o]ne who is stumbled 
over often enough may, understandably, notice that these cumulative impacts bear a certain func-
tional resemblance to kicks.” Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977). 
 37 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982). 
 38 Rex v. Smith, 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915). 
39 See infra notes 42–156 and accompanying text (discussing the qualities required to make an 
effective police supervisor and critically exploring the job examinations used in hiring these su-
pervisors). 
40 See infra notes 157–232 and accompanying text (analyzing the Lopez litigation). 
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success as a supervisor, I conclude with a proposal to expand the scope of 
Title VII liability and remedies in these cases by importing basic tort and 
criminal law understandings of “intent.”41 
I. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SELECTING  
SKILLED POLICE SUPERVISORS 
As in any organization, effective supervision is a key to success of the 
enterprise. This is particularly the case with paramilitary agencies like po-
lice departments. The investigative reports prepared by the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) between 2015 and 2017 following the highly-
publicized police shootings in several of our cities focus needed attention 
on this fact:  
  It has long been recognized that first-level supervisors, 
through their action or inaction, profoundly affect the perfor-
mance of the officers under their command. In the patrol setting, 
sergeants are most directly involved in setting the tone of policing 
on the street. Sergeants who take a lax approach to supervision 
foster an environment in which mediocrity and misconduct flour-
ish.42 
The Report on the Ferguson Police Department (“FPD”) exposed the 
failures of supervision of line officers, especially with regard to “constitu-
tional and other legal restrictions on officer action, as well as additional fac-
tors officers should consider before taking enforcement action (such as po-
lice legitimacy and procedural justice considerations).”43 DOJ observed: 
  The recommendations set out here cannot be implemented 
without dedicated, skilled, and well-trained supervisors who po-
lice lawfully and without bias. . . . FPD should: Ensure that an 
adequate number of qualified first-line supervisors are deployed 
in the field to allow supervisors to provide close and effective su-
pervision to each officer under the supervisor’s direct command, 
provide officers with the direction and guidance necessary to im-
                                                                                                                           
41 See infra notes 233–272 and accompanying text (proposing the use of tort and criminal law 
definitions of intent by the courts to resolve the problems of discriminatory testing). 
 42 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 106 (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter CPD DOJ REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/opa/
file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/2SFD-BXZN]. 
43 FPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 26, at 95. 
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prove and develop as officers, and to identify, correct, and prevent 
misconduct.44 
With particular pertinence to this paper, DOJ concluded: 
  There are widespread concerns about the lack of diversity, 
especially race and gender diversity, among FPD officers. FPD 
should modify its systems for recruiting hiring and promotion to: 
Ensure that the department’s officer hiring and selection process-
es include an objective process for selection that employs reliable 
and valid selection devices that comport with best practices and 
federal anti-discrimination laws [and] implement validated pre-
employment screening mechanisms to ensure temperamental and 
skill-set suitability for policing.45 
In finding that the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) “has engaged 
in a pattern or practice of serious violations of the U.S. Constitution and 
federal law that has disproportionately harmed Baltimore’s African-
American community and eroded the public’s trust in the police,” 46 DOJ 
pointed to “deficient policies, training and accountability systems,” as well 
as “insufficient oversight from supervisors.”47 In some cases, unconstitu-
tional stops resulted from superior officers’ explicit instructions: 
During a ride-along with Justice Department officials, a BPD ser-
geant instructed a patrol officer to stop a group of young African-
American males on a street corner, question them, and order them 
to disperse. When the patrol officer protested that he had no valid 
reason to stop the group, the sergeant replied, “[t]hen make some-
thing up.” This incident is far from anomalous.48 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 95–96. 
 46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Finds a Pat-
tern of Civil Rights Violations by the Baltimore Police Department (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-investigation-baltimore-police-department 
[https://perma.cc/4ABU-9TTP]. 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 5, 10 (Aug. 10, 2016) [hereinafter BPD DOJ REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.cc/3TZT-5WNC]. 
 48 Id. at 29. A lieutenant portrayed in The Wire, the highly acclaimed real-life HBO drama 
about policing in Baltimore, arrived at the scene where a black teenager had been brutally assault-
ed by a white officer without any justification. The following conversation ensued: 
Lieutenant: Now tell me, who cold-cocked the kid? 
Officer: Me. 
Lieutenant: Why? 
Officer: He pissed me off. 
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. . . .  
[After an unlawful stop and beating of a civilian, t]he sergeant 
who responded to the scene “confirmed that the involved officers 
tased the man twice and hit him in the face with their fists,” yet 
the sergeant’s report of the incident concluded that the “officers 
showed great restraint and professionalism…” [Further, w]e 
found evidence that BPD supervisors have explicitly condoned 
trespassing arrests that do not meet constitutional standards, and 
evidence suggesting that trespassing enforcement is focused on 
public housing developments. A shift commander for one of 
BPD’s districts emailed a template for describing trespassing ar-
rests to a sergeant and a patrol officer. The template provides a 
blueprint for arresting an individual standing on or near a public 
housing development who cannot give a “valid reason” for being 
there—a facially unconstitutional detention. Equally troubling is 
the fact that the template contains blanks to be filled in for details 
of the arrest, including the arrest data and location and the sus-
pect’s name and address, but does not include a prompt to fill in 
the race or gender of the arrestee. Rather, the words “black male” 
are automatically included in the description of the arrest.49 The 
supervisor’s template thus presumes that individuals arrested for 
trespassing will be African American.50 
DOJ determined that “BPD supervisors conduct minimal substantive 
review of officers’ justifications for stops, searches, and arrests,” and “al-
most universally sign off on the bases for stops and searches—even where 
officers describe facially unlawful activity.”51 BPD supervisors viewed their 
role “as merely documenting officer activity, not reviewing it for compli-
ance with policy and law.”52 The result is “overwhelming statistical evi-
                                                                                                                           
Lieutenant: No, Officer Pryzbylewski, he did not piss you off. He made you fear 
for your safety and that of your fellow officers. I’m guessing now, but maybe he was 
seen to pick up a bottle and menace officers Hauk and Carver both of whom had al-
ready sustained injury from flying projectiles. Rather than use deadly force in such a 
situation maybe you elected to approach the youth, ordering him to drop the bottle. 
Maybe when he raised the bottle in a threatening manner you used a [flashlight], not 
the handle of your service weapon to incapacitate the suspect. Go practice. 
The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 9, 2002). 
 49 See infra Appendix B, also available at https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/
law-review-content/BCLR/59-7/brodin-appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUF8-TPRE]. 
 50 BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 47, at 30, 37. 
51 Id. at 44. 
 52 Id. at 45. 
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dence of racial disparities in BPD’s stops, searches, and arrests.”53 In some 
cases, BPD supervisors instructed their subordinates to specifically target 
African-Americans. Even when individuals formally complain about racial 
bias, “BPD supervisors almost universally misclassify the complaint as mi-
nor misconduct—such as discourtesy—that does not reflect its racial ele-
ments.”54 
An officers’ use of force, even deadly, is rarely monitored: 
One sergeant informed us during an interview that judging an of-
ficer’s tactics is simply not part of a use of force investigation; he 
did not deem it to be his job to “second-guess” an officer’s tac-
tics. This is a failure in supervision—it is a sergeant’s job to men-
tor officers in areas where they may benefit from additional guid-
ance. The sergeant’s statement here reflects a lack of understand-
ing of the role of a supervisor, and indicates a Departmental fail-
ure to train sergeants on how to be effective supervisors.55 
DOJ found in fact that the BPD “fails to adequately supervise its officers:”56 
This lack of supervision manifests itself in multiple ways, includ-
ing a failure to guide officer activity through effective policies 
and training; a failure to collect and analyze reliable data to su-
pervise officer enforcement activities; and the lack of a meaning-
ful early intervention system (EIS) to identify officers who may 
benefit from additional training or other guidance to ensure that 
they do not commit constitutional violations. . . . In an agency of 
BPD’s size, command-level and supervisory training is critical to 
ensuring that the values of the agency are reinforced by its leaders 
on a consistent, day-to-day basis.57 
DOJ similarly attributed the widespread unlawful use of excessive (of-
ten deadly) force in the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) particularly 
directed at minorities, to “a critical failure of leadership at the first line of 
supervision within CPD.”58 The City has paid over half a billion dollars to 
settle police misconduct cases since 2004, but the offending officers have 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 48. 
 54 Id. at 66. 
 55 Id. at 106. 
 56 Id. at 128. 
 57 Id. at 128, 133. 
 58 CPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 42, at 106. 
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rarely been disciplined59 and the accountability structure is completely dys-
functional.60 
“Good supervision,” DOJ continues, “would correct improper arrests 
by an officer before they became routine,”61 yet sergeants played no role in 
reviewing use of force by CPD officers, thus contributing to the “pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional force:”62 
[W]ith notable exceptions, supervisors do not lead. . . . [S]ergeants 
are “not there to ruffle any feathers.” Rather than ensuring that of-
ficers under their watch are policing constitutionally, many ser-
geants instead focus on keeping their subordinates out of trouble 
when there may be reason for discipline. Supervisors do not re-
view the personnel records of the officers they are supervising, ei-
ther because they do not know how, they do not have access to 
the information, or they do not see the value in doing so. . . . [Su-
pervisors] are more concerned with being “friends” with their 
subordinates than providing adequate supervision [and] stay “too 
close” to their former peers after being promoted.63 
“Dedicated, highly qualified supervisors are vital to ensuring CPD of-
ficers are able to police safely while valuing and respecting the rights of all 
community members,” the DOJ concluded, “but under CPD’s current pro-
motions system, officers can be promoted to detective, sergeant, or lieuten-
ant based on test scores or evaluation of other merit-based criteria.”64 DOJ 
recommended that “[p]romotional exams must be reviewed regularly to en-
sure they are fair and lawful.”65 The problems are traced directly back to the 
selection process: 
In Chicago, a lack of transparency around promotional systems and 
decisions, and years of litigation regarding CPD’s promotion pro-
cess, have created a narrative among the rank-and-file that CPD 
does not value good leadership, and that current leaders are unqual-
ified to lead. Despite attempts at reform, officers we interviewed 
continue to view the promotions system with skepticism, which has 
decreased officer morale and undermined effective supervision. 
CPD’s promotions system should be regularly reviewed, and re-
                                                                                                                           
 59 Lydialyle Gibson, Policing the Police, ABA J., Sept. 2016, at 60. 
 60 CPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 42, at 46–47. 
 61 FPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 26, at 22. 
 62 CPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 42, at 44, 105. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 13. 
 65 Id. 
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vised if necessary, with the aim of increasing transparency and en-
suring the promotion of candidates who will make CPD better able 
to police effectively and respectfully, while continuing to abide by 
court orders put in place to ensure that candidates are not unlawful-
ly excluded from promotions on the basis of race or sex.66 
As a Boston Police Commissioner has testified, “[t]he sergeant’s posi-
tion is really where the rubber hits the road as far as supervising individuals, 
and it’s really the most important link.”67 A police management manual 
agrees: 
[T]he first-line supervisor plays an indispensable role in the en-
forcement of American law . . . . Upon them rests most of the re-
sponsibility for providing the cohesive force that wields the work-
ing force into a well-functioning, smoothly operating unit. No 
matter how capable the leaders are at or near the top level of 
management, they will operate in a near vacuum if wise leader-
ship is not provided at the operational level where the day-to-day 
work is done . . . . The supervisory officer must be adept at apply-
ing the principles of wholesome human relations with common 
sense so that he can best integrate the needs of employees with 
the goals of management.68 
In sum, selection of the supervisors of police officers in our communi-
ties is far too important to be left to the vagaries of a dubious job 
knowledge exam. Yet in each of the troubled departments investigated, as in 
Boston, these exams continue to play the determinative role in who be-
comes a first-line supervisor. Promotion to sergeant in Baltimore requires 
passing a qualifying written test before moving on to an oral exam.69 Fergu-
son’s selection process also begins with a written exam followed by a citi-
zen oral interview board, a law enforcement oral board, a problem-solving 
exercise, and finally an interview with the Chief.70 Candidates in Chicago 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 129. 
 67 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 8, Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 
No. 07-11693-GAO (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I) (Testimony of Commissioner Edward 
Davis); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, HOW POLICE SUPER-
VISORY STYLES INFLUENCE PATROL OFFICER BEHAVIOR, at ii (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files1/nij/194078.pdf [https://perma.cc/92T9-5F7D] (noting that studies find that a supervisor’s 
behavior may heavily impact the behavior of his or her subordinates). 
 68 NATHAN F. IANNONE ET AL., SUPERVISION OF POLICE PERSONNEL, at viii, 1–2 (2001). 
 69 City of Baltimore, Dep’t of Human Res., Promotion Job Poster (Mar. 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 70 City of Ferguson, Office of the Chief of Police, Promotion Job Poster (Dec. 2012) (on file 
with author). 
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must similarly pass a multiple-choice qualifying exam, but in recognition of 
its limitations, an alternative process was instituted for thirty percent of the 
promotions “to identify CPD members with supervisory potential who do not 
necessarily score well on promotional exams, given that previous promotion-
al exams had an adverse impact on minority eligibility for promotions.”71 
II. WHAT WE WANT IN A POLICE SUPERVISOR: KNOWLEDGE,  
SKILLS, AND CHARACTER 
It is universally recognized that “[b]eing an effective [police] supervi-
sor or manager requires more than ‘book smarts’; candidates must be able 
to effectively manage real world situations requiring interactions with oth-
ers.”72 What are the requisite attributes for success in such a position?73 
As a deputy chief of police stated, “you can have all the skills and 
knowledge of a great supervisor, but you’ll struggle without the right people 
skills.”74 “It makes sense,” he asserts, “to place primary reliance on past 
performance evaluations to assess how the candidate functions within the 
unit.”75 Good judgment under stress is best assessed through “in-basket” ex-
ercises that present hypotheticals requiring a recommended course of ac-
tion.76 
Police supervisors require “good management skills, including the 
ability to motivate employees, and to communicate information between 
                                                                                                                           
 71 CPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 42, at 130. 
 72 Public Safety Promotional Testing, PSI SERVS. LLC, https://www.psionline.com/talent-
measurement/public-safety/promotional-testing/#tktest: [https://perma.cc/2UWR-A2EL]; see also 
PAUL M. WHISENAND, SUPERVISING POLICE PERSONNEL, at viii (2001) (discussing the skills 
needed by supervisors). 
 73 The Chicago P.D.’s long list of skills, abilities, and personal characteristics for its supervi-
sors includes: Analytical Thinking and Problem Solving, Judgment and Decision Making, Written 
and Oral Communication, Interpersonal Relations, Coaching and Developing Others, Resolving 
Conflicts and Negotiating with Others, Open-Mindedness, Leadership, Planning and Organizing, 
Professional Orientation and Commitment, Personal Integrity, Initiative and Self Development, 
Stress Tolerance, Adaptability, and Dependability. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, LIEUTENANT PROMO-
TIONAL PROCESS: WRITTEN JOB KNOWLEDGE (QUALIFYING) EXAMINATION, ORIENTATION, AND 
PREPARATION GUIDE 2–4 (2014). 
 74 Interview with Gary Gasseling, Deputy Chief of Police, Eastern Washington University 
(Nov. 15, 2016) (on file with author). Mr. Gasseling is a former Washington State Patrol Officer 
and SWAT Team member. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. Regarding such “judgment” questions, a testing expert cautioned that, “there is certainly 
no reason to believe that a person taking this test will experience the same emotions and really 
relive the same experience if he were actually confronted with the situation. So, what he may say 
he would do under these circumstances may be vastly different from what he would actually do.” 
Guardians Ass’n of NYPD v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 526, 544 
(S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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ranks.”77 Communication skills are key.78 This is particularly true as many 
departments move towards a community policing and de-escalation mod-
el.79 Training subordinates is a vital function performed by sergeants, and 
the potential of candidates to do this successfully should be meaningfully 
measured.80 
Equally important is “command presence,” the “natural manner of an 
individual indicating a complete command of his mental and physical facul-
ties and emotions,” and the “ability and qualifications to take command of 
any situation.”81 The process of selection should also identify the candi-
date’s traits of “honorableness, courageousness, and vitality.”82 
As set out in the next Part, job knowledge tests woefully fail in all 
these regards, at the cost of excluding candidates who may very well have 
the skills to excel as supervisors, while promoting those who do not. Among 
the former, minorities are disproportionately represented. This has wide-
ranging ramifications, including the matter of wealth inequality between 
black and white citizens, as it is well-documented that minorities on the 
whole earn significantly more in the public sector than in the private.83 Po-
lice and fire positions are a ticket to becoming “solidly middle-class.”84 
Also, at stake is the perceived illegitimacy of a police force that does 
not reflect the demographics of the community it serves, a matter that goes 
to the heart of its effectiveness.85 As one journal puts it: 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 78 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 9, Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 
No. 07-11693-GAO (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I) (Testimony of Commissioner Edward 
Davis); IANNONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 98. 
 79 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 10, Lopez I, No. 07-11693-GAO. 
 80 IANNONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 61–62. 
 81 Id. at 35–36. 
 82 Id. at 9. 
 83 Rebecca M. Blank, An Analysis of Workers’ Choice Between Employment in the Public and 
Private Sectors, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 211, 223 (1985). The average salary of police offic-
ers in Massachusetts is approximately $56,000, and supervisors start at $82,000, with additional 
amounts for overtime, special paid details, et cetera. Breana Noble, What Is the Average Salary of 
a Police Officer in Massachusetts?, NEWSMAX (July 15, 2015, 9:29 PM), https://www.newsmax.
com/FastFeatures/average-salary-police-officerMassachusetts/2015/07/15/id/657320/ [https://perma.
cc/9WX7-T8N4]. 
 84 Sanneh, supra note 24, at 74. 
 85 For the large literature on legitimacy, see generally Joseph Gustafson, Diversity in Munici-
pal Police Agencies: A National Examination of Minority Hiring and Promotion, 36 POLICING 719 
(2013) (examining “crises of legitimacy” in American policing); Riccucci & Riccardelli, supra note 
3, at 354 (discussing the role of legitimacy). The story goes back at least to the Kerner Commission 
(National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorder), convened after the disturbances in Watts in 
1967 prompted by allegations of police brutality. 
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[C]ompromised police legitimacy [as a result of poor minority 
representation] has been expressed in the form of non-cooperation 
and perceptions of distrust among the minority urban public. . . . 
Agencies reflecting the demographics of their surroundings better 
understand the perspectives of residents and can communicate 
with them more effectively.86  
Lack of acceptability may encourage higher violent crime rates, as disaffected 
citizens resort to self-help.87 
Achieving diversity throughout, including the supervisory ranks, is 
thus particularly beneficial to both the internal and external operation of the 
police department.88 
III. JOB KNOWLEDGE EXAMS—THE MASSACHUSETTS  
EXPERIENCE AND BEYOND 
Massachusetts’ Civil Service utilizes multiple-choice job knowledge 
tests for its selection of first-line police supervisors. Although such tests are 
in widespread use around the country,89 the Commonwealth is somewhat 
unique in its near sole reliance on these devices for determining promo-
tions.90 Some departments use the exams as initial screening tools to deter-
mine who should go forward in a multi-component process; others give the 
written exam significantly less weight than Massachusetts.91 One observer 
has noted that the exams have “become such a pattern and practice, so in-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Gustafson, supra note 85, at 719–20. 
 87 Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of Violent Crime in Struc-
turally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 469, 470–71 (2005). 
 88 Gustafson, supra note 85, at 732. 
 89 One study surveying the use of written examinations across the nation found that only two of 
the sixty-one cities studied did not rely on them in their selection process. Riccucci & Riccardelli, 
supra note 3, at 358–59. 
 90 Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 174 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 91 Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent from Ricci v. DeStefano in 2009, contrasted New Haven’s 
experience with that of nearby Bridgeport, where minority firefighters held one-third of lieutenant 
and captain positons: 
Bridgeport . . . had once used a testing process similar to New Haven’s, with a writ-
ten exam accounting for 70 percent of an applicant’s score, an oral exam for 25 per-
cent, and seniority for the remaining five percent. Bridgeport recognized, however, 
that the oral component, more so than the written component, addressed the sort of 
“real-life scenarios” fire officers encounter on the job. Accordingly, that city 
“changed the relative weights” to give primacy to the oral exam. Since that time . . . 
Bridgeport had seen minorities “fairly represented” in its exam results. 
557 U.S. 557, 614 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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grained in the cultural fabric of public sector human resources that . . . the 
use of written tests is not even being questioned.”92 
The Massachusetts tests (always closed-book) typically consist of 
eighty or one hundred multiple-choice questions, comprising eighty percent 
of the applicant’s total score. The other twenty percent factor, the “educa-
tion and experience” or “E & E” rating, merely inventories courses taken 
and years of experience, all very common to typical applicants for promo-
tion. In reality, the “E & E” has virtually no effect on one’s rank, leaving the 
exams as determinative.93  
The exams purport to measure “the knowledge, skills and abilities 
which can be practically and reliably measured and which are actually re-
quired to perform the primary or dominant duties of the position,” as re-
quired by civil service law.94 The text of the questions are drawn directly, 
sometimes verbatim, from police manuals identified in a reading list pro-
vided in advance of the exams.95 
The applicants’ task is to memorize these manuals, and the brass ring 
goes to those who best accomplish this goal.96 In upholding the challenged 
exam in Lopez v. Lawrence in 2016, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ref-
erenced the following question without apparently realizing that the prompt 
asked not what the right answer was, but instead what the manual said: 
According to [a criminal investigations textbook on the reading 
list], a warrantless search and seizure is acceptable: 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Riccucci & Riccardelli, supra note 3, at 357–59. 
 93 Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lopez II), cert. denied 
137 S. Ct. 1088 (2017). 
 94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 31, § 16; see also Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 109 (discussing the civil 
service law requirements). Although Chapter 31 envisions “written, oral, practical or performance 
tests, training and experience rating, assessment centers, other generally accepted selection proce-
dures, or combinations of these, which in the discretion and judgment of the administrator, are 
appropriate for the position title or occupational group being tested,” implementation in Massachu-
setts and many other localities has typically focused on written exams. Riccucci & Riccardelli, 
supra note 3, at 358–60. 
 95 The Houston P.D. Job Poster for Police Sergeant, for example, instructs that the source 
material for the exam will be “based solely” on the texts on the reading list. Hous. Police Dep’t, 
Job Promotion Poster (May 2012) (on file with author). 
 96 The Third Circuit found such tests: 
rewarded test-taking ability rather than the knowledges, abilities, and skills neces-
sary for the [fire captain] position; that the test focused on a candidate’s ability to 
recall data from particular texts rather than his knowledge or abilities; that test ques-
tions were ambiguously phrased; and that questions tested knowledge of terminolo-
gy rather than of the underlying concepts. 
Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 832 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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A. after stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation and writing a 
citation. 
B. after obtaining the consent of the person, regardless of 
whether obtained voluntarily or nonvoluntarily. 
C. when possible loss or destruction of evidence exists. 
D. when a quick search of the trunk of a motor vehicle is de-
sired.97 
Similarly, the Chicago exam for promotion to lieutenant instructs: 
“You must recall from memory the information contained in the related ref-
erences required to answer the questions.”98 There are fully nine pages of 
references. These are sample questions: 
• When an officer discharges a chemical agent within the City limits, the 
officer must notify the Office of Emergency Management Communica-
tion (OEMC), his or her supervisor, and the: 
 
A. District Field Lieutenant in the district of occurrence. B. Crime Pre-
vention and Information Center (CPIC). C. District Station Supervisor 
(DSS) in the district of occurrence. D. Bureau of Investigative Services 
Detective Division. 
 
• As the Watch Operations Lieutenant, you need to change the day-off 
group assignment of some of your officers. You only need two volun-
teers, however, six officers have volunteered. Under these circum-
stances, who should you choose? 
 
A. Two volunteers with the least seniority on the watch. B. Two volun-
teers with the greatest seniority on the watch. C. Two volunteers on the 
watch who applied first. D. All six of the officers on the watch who 
volunteered. 
 
• Pat Bane is a street vendor and has permission to peddle in a public al-
ley. According to the Municipal Code of Chicago (MCC), Pat may 
conduct this activity only during the hours of: 
 
A. 8:00 am–6:00 pm. B. 7:00 am–7:00 pm. C. 5:00 am–7:00 pm. D. 
7:00 am–5:00 pm. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 110. 
 98 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, LIEUTENANT PROMOTIONAL PROCESS, supra note 73, at 3. 
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• You notice that within the last week Sergeant Boll is not performing to 
his usual standards. He has been slow in responding to assignments 
and is not interacting with others in his usual manner. How would you 
handle this situation? 
 
A. Sit down with Sergeant Boll and ask if he is having any problems, 
discuss the behaviors you have observed, and explain the expectations 
he is to meet on the job. B. Conduct a formal counselling session with 
Sergeant Boll and document the session on the appropriate form. C. 
Talk with other sergeants on the watch to see if they are aware of any 
problems Sergeant Boll may be having prior to talking with him.99 
The Houston Sergeants’ exam instructs: 
Questions 1–8 are taken from Hess and Orthmann, Management 
and Supervision in Law Enforcement, 6th edition, and are to be 
answered in accordance with this text. 
 
1. Leadership has been defined as: 
 
A. the administrative ordering of things and people. B. working 
with and through individuals and groups to accomplish, organiza-
tional goals. C. the skillful oversight of people and tasks. D. plan-
ning, organizing, and directing organizations. 
 
Questions 9–14 are taken from Perez and Moore, Police Ethics: A 
Matter of Character, 2nd edition, and are to be answered in ac-
cordance with this text. 
 
9. Which of the following is cited as the “baseline paradox of po-
lice work”? 
 
A. The contradiction between the legal authority to exercise pow-
er and the exercise of that power in practical, real-life situations. 
B. The conflicting realities of police work as depicted in the train-
ing academy or university program and the nature of police work 
required on the street. C. Conflicting ethical standards among the 
citizens, the police and other elements of the criminal justice sys-
tem. D. The multiple, conflicting, and vague nature of what the 
police do created confusion for the police, distrust of the police, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. at 7–8. 
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and difficulties that directly impact the discussion of what ethical 
conduct is. 
 
12. Which of the following statements about Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative is correct? 
 
A. It tests the moral validity of any action. B. It applies universal-
ly to all situations. C. It has the force of a law of reason and is not 
in any respect optional. It is absolute. D. All of the above.100 
A question on Alexandria Virginia promotion exam is similarly taken 
directly from the police manual: 
Your officers have collected a loaded gun and ecstasy pills as evi-
dence. If the evidence needs laboratory analysis, how many sepa-
rate Property Inventory forms (APD-39) are needed? 
 
A. 1. B. 2. C. 3. D. 4.101 
Do such questions meaningfully aid in the selection of police supervi-
sors, or could such “job knowledge” be gained readily on the job, or looked 
up when necessary,102 or imparted in modest training?103 As one court skep-
tically questioned, “Is there a clear link between the information needed to 
answer the question and work performance?” and “Is the knowledge re-
quired to answer the question required of the incumbent to perform the 
work?”104 
Although police departments may claim (as Boston has) that the ex-
am’s purpose is “not to test memorization of facts, but to test situational 
judgment, interpersonal relations, communication ability, and knowledge of 
rules and regulations,”105 that is clearly belied by the fact that the answers 
are taken directly from the assigned texts, not from the judgment of the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, SERGEANT: SAMPLE TEST (2012) (on file with author). 
 101 ALEXANDRIA POLICE DEP’T, 2015 SERGEANT PROMOTIONAL PROCESS, PREPARING FOR 
THE MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST 21 (2015) (on file with author). 
 102 See Guardians Ass’n of NYPD v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 526, 
542 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The types of knowledge, 
skills or behaviors [tested should not] include those which can be acquired in a brief orientation to 
the job.”); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15(C)(3) 
(2018). 
 103 See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1173 (1991). 
 104 Rudder v. Dist. of Columbia, 890 F. Supp. 23, 42 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 99 F.3d 448 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996). 
 105 Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2015). 
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candidate. The Chicago exam manual actually advises candidates to “[u]se 
flashcards to memorize and quiz yourself on factual information or defini-
tions.”106 The Columbus Ohio tests were found by the trial judge to be “lit-
tle more than a test of reading comprehension and memory,” but the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless ruled them sufficiently related to the 
requirements of job.107 This despite the recognition that they measured 
knowledge and not performance, that the skills tested were not represented 
in proportion to what would be utilized on job, and that one-third of multi-
ple-choice questions were taken from a police management textbook that 
was not even assigned.108 
Massachusetts Civil Service readily acknowledges that “some of the 
skills identified as important . . . could not be evaluated by a written test, 
such as the ability to establish rapport with persons from different ethnic, 
cultural, and/or economic backgrounds,’’ admitting that “assessment of the 
performance of these skills and abilities would require the use of selection 
devices outside the scope of the written, multiple-choice format.”109 Also 
conspicuously absent from measurement are: (a) “ability to make and carry 
out decisions quickly”; (b) “ability to give clear, concise verbal orders”; (c) 
“ability to communicate orally and in writing”; (d) “ability to bring claim to 
control surroundings when in stress producing situations”; and (e) “ability to 
establish rapport with surroundings when in stress producing situations.”110 
                                                                                                                           
 106 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, LIEUTENANT PROMOTIONAL PROCESS, supra note 73, at 19. 
107 Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 916 F.2d 1092, 1098 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
 108 Id.; see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Courts have long criticized 
written firefighter promotion exams for being ‘more probative of the test-taker’s ability to recall 
what a particular text stated on a given topic than of his firefighting or supervisory abilities.’” 
(quoting Vulcan Pioneers v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 625 F. Supp. 527, 539 (D.N.J. 1985))). 
 109 Smith, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 187. Another format, for example, is PSI Services’ oral examina-
tion: 
PSI’s oral work sample simulations are designed to assess the supervisory and man-
agerial abilities of candidates at all promotion ranks. Trained assessors observe can-
didate performance in simulated subordinate counseling sessions, incident command 
scenarios, witness interviews, meetings with community groups, internal policy/
program development meetings, critical incident reviews and structured interviews. 
Test materials are customized to reflect the specific issues, practices and procedures 
of relevance to each agency. 
Public Safety Promotional Testing, supra note 72. For additional discussion of alternative meth-
ods, see infra notes 233–272 and accompanying text. 
 110 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 32, Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 
No. 07-11693-GAO (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I). Judge Wyzanski, assessing the entry level 
exam in the first police case, observed: 
No doubt appropriate tests should be part verbal. But appropriate tests would also 
seek, and not necessarily by written examination, to discover how effective a po-
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Two former police commissioners in Boston have testified about the 
tight constraints these tests put on their ability to achieve diversity and pro-
mote those with the most potential for success. They would substitute as-
sessment centers [discussed below in Part VII] and evaluations of past job 
performance as far better indicators of future success as a supervisor.111 
Robert Di Grazia, Boston police commissioner during the turbulent years of 
1972 to 1976 when the federal court’s school desegregation order sparked 
racial tensions and violence that ripped the city apart, discarded the memo-
rization exams in favor of oral boards to determine management and leader-
ship skills.112 His reforms met considerable resistance from the police offic-
ers’ union and did not survive his resignation in 1976.113 
Not only do the exams woefully fail to meet the legal standard as “job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty,”114 they disproportionately exclude minority candidates.115 The explana-
tion for the underperformance is perhaps best summed up by Susan Sturm 
and Lani Guinier stating: written tests “tell us more about past opportunity 
[i.e., education, family resources, etc.] than about future accomplishments 
on the job or in the classroom.”116 “Testing itself may favor the affluent be-
cause, for instance, they are more familiar with written examinations. Those 
raised in impoverished neighborhoods may possess equal potential but less 
                                                                                                                           
liceman is as an embodiment of authority, as a community worker charged with the 
mediating and counselling functions of a patrolman, as a mature individual restrain-
ing and simultaneously educating young or unstable members of the community, as 
a street official directing traffic, as a watchman guarding persons and property 
threatened with harm, as an investigator reporting incidents to superior officers, as a 
witness testifying in courts . . . . 
Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655, 666 (D. Mass. 1973). 
 111 Smith, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 203 n.31. 
 112 William J. Bratton & Chuck Wexler, A Top Cop Who Made a Difference, BOS. GLOBE, 
May 4, 2018, at A11. 
 113 Lee A. Daniels, Bostonians Not Neutral of New Montgomery Police Chief, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 4, 1977, at A8. 
 114 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 115 The adverse impact extends beyond tests for public safety positions. In Connecticut v. 
Teal, for example, the written promotion test for promotion in the Department of Income Mainte-
nance produced a pass rate for black applicants that was only sixty-eight percent the rate for 
whites. 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982). 
 116 Susan Strum & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative 
Model, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996); see also Smith, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 197 (noting multiple 
factors, including historical factors, that influence the testing disparity); Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. 
DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case and the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 222–25 (2011) (explaining that the differing opportunities presented to 
minorities compared to whites likely influences the scoring disparity). 
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opportunity to demonstrate such potential due to inadequate schooling or 
mentorship.”117 
The defendants’ own expert in Lopez v. City of Lawrence acknowl-
edged that “cognitive tests measure many constructs associated with social 
status and privilege (i.e., scholastic knowledge and skills), giving rise to 
sizable black-white differences on these tests. Indeed, racial subgroup dif-
ferences on cognitive tests are so large that they will create substantial re-
ductions in the number of black applicants hired, to an extent that far ex-
ceeds the performance advantages of these tests.”118 The expert even coined 
the phrase “performance-irrelevant race-related variance” (“PIRV”) to cap-
ture the wide disconnect between test scores and job performance.119 Efforts 
to design written police exams with reduced racial impact have not been 
very successful.120 
The multiple-choice format relies on convergent thinking (selecting a 
single best answer) as compared to divergent thinking (generating multiple 
solutions to a problem), and experience has taught that minorities perform 
better on the latter rather than the former. 121 If police supervisory work re-
quires “thinking outside the box,” job knowledge exams are advancing the 
wrong candidates and excluding the right ones. 
With all their deficiencies, how have job knowledge exams been able 
to survive judicial scrutiny? The answer lies in large part in the significant 
watering down of the standards for validation, as set out in the next Part. 
IV. THE CURRENT REGIME: THE VALIDATION GAME AND  
THE DILUTION OF STANDARDS 
To pass muster under Title VII once disparate impact has been estab-
lished, the employer must (as noted above) demonstrate that the challenged 
device is both “job related” for the particular position and justified by 
“business necessity.”122 It must be shown to measure characteristics that 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 484 (2003). 
 118 James L. Outtz & Daniel A. Newman, A Theory of Adverse Impact, in ADVERSE IMPACT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION 53, 54–55 (James 
L. Outtz ed., 2010). Dr. Outtz criticized the use of unnecessarily difficult words in several ques-
tions on the exam in the Lopez litigation, including “synoptic,” “homogeneous,” “unequivocal,” 
and “apportioned.” See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 79, Lopez I, No. 
07-11693-GAO. 
 119 Outtz & Newman, supra note 118, at 55–56. 
 120 See, e.g., Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 121 Outtz & Newman, supra note 118, at 81–92. 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). Use of a professionally developed test is a de-
fense to a disparate impact case, provided this demonstration is made. Id. § 2000e-2(h). 
2018] Discriminatory Job Knowledge Tests 2345 
constitute “important element[s] of work behavior,” and that the outcomes 
are “predictive of or significantly correlated with the characteristic.”123 
There must be, in sum, “a demonstrable relationship to successful perfor-
mance of the jobs for which [the device] is used.”124 This is the process of 
validation. Validation standards were strictly interpreted in the Supreme 
Court’s early cases, but have been diluted significantly since, especially for 
public safety employers. 
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody125 
adopted the professional methodology to determine validation established 
by the American Psychological Association and incorporated the EEOC 
Guidelines.126 A statistically significant correlation between test results and 
job performance was required.127 In Moody, test takers were “followed” 
onto the factory floor and their performance evaluated by supervisors in a 
concurrent criterion validation study.128 The goal was to assess the actual 
predictive power of the device. The EEOC Guidelines are particularly skep-
tical of pen and pencil tests, which must be “closely reviewed for job rele-
vance,” and are most appropriate where the job primarily requires writing, 
not interpersonal, skills.129 
Yet only one year later, in a case involving the District of Columbia 
Police Department, the bar of validation dropped precipitously (albeit in 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 179, 201 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 124 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 125 422 U.S. 405, 405 (1975). 
 126 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2018). 
 127 Moody, 422 U.S. at 431–36. 
 128 Id. at 430; see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B). A concurrent criterion-related validity study is 
“where the examination is administered to a group of job incumbents prior to administering it to 
job candidates or administering it at the same time and then measuring the job performance of the 
incumbents to determine whether their test scores are correlated to their job performance.” Stewart 
v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:04CV00885 RWS, 2007 WL 6211634, at *15 (E.D. Mo. May 25, 
2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2008). On this exacting standard, the multiple-choice exam 
used by the Boston Fire Department was found to be invalid in its first challenge. See NAACP v. 
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the examination was not sufficiently 
related to the job of a firefighter). 
 129 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (B)(3) (2018). The Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines Interpre-
tation and Clarification (Questions & Answers) #78 provides that: 
 Paper-and-pencil tests which are intended to replicate a work behavior are most 
likely to be appropriate where work behaviors are performed in paper and pencil 
form (e.g., editing and bookkeeping). Paper-and-pencil test of effectiveness in inter-
personal relations (e.g., sales or supervision), or of physical activities (e.g., automo-
bile repair) or ability to function properly under danger (e.g., firefighters) generally 
are not close enough approximations of work behaviors to show content validity. 
Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines Interpretation and Clarification (Questions and Answers), 
BIDDLE CONSULTING GRP. (2015), http://uniformguidelines.com/questionandanswers.html [https://
perma.cc/VV7F-VQFB]. 
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context of a primarily constitutional, not Title VII challenge). In Washington 
v. Davis,130 the Supreme Court deemed a forty question verbal skills exam a 
valid selector for police officers, despite its disproportionate exclusion of 
black candidates, because there was a “positive relationship” between Test 
21 and training school performance, as measured by another verbal skills 
test.131 The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ rul-
ing that struck down the written test because it was not shown to be predic-
tive of performance on the job.132 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, 
arguing the decision unwisely weakened the mandate for validation.133 
The courts have since moved even further away from the original con-
ception. Although the EEOC Guidelines had required a showing that empir-
ically-demonstrated predictive validation was not feasible in the particular 
case before alternative methods could be used, 134 a relaxed “content valida-
tion” is now the norm—a showing that the test appears to be job related 
because it purports to replicate key job tasks.135 And where the standard 
                                                                                                                           
 130 426 U.S. 229, 229 (1976). 
131 Id. at 250–54. 
 132 Id. at 253. 
 133 If the decision stands, the dissenters observed, “employers could validate any entrance 
examination that measures only verbal ability by giving another written test that measures verbal 
ability at the end of a training course.” Id. at 269 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ. dissenting). “[The 
defendants] should have been required to prove that the police training examinations either meas-
ure job-related skills or predict job performance.” Id. The Second Circuit agreed in another police 
case: “[W]ithout a showing that performance at training school correlated with performance on the 
job, demonstration of a high correlation between entry level test scores and training school per-
formance meant little.” Guardians Ass’n of NYPD v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of N.Y., 431 F. 
Supp. 526, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 134 Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm’n, 354 F. Supp. 
778, 788–89 (D. Conn. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 482 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 135 Section 1607.14(C)(4) of the EEOC Guidelines provides: 
[T]o be content valid, a selection procedure measuring a skill or ability should either 
closely approximate an observable work behavior, or its product should closely ap-
proximate an observable work product. If a test purports to sample a work behavior 
or to provide a sample of a work product, the manner and setting of the selection 
procedure and its level and complexity should closely approximate the work situa-
tion. The closer the content and the context of the selection procedure are to work 
samples or work behaviors, the stronger is the basis for showing content validity. As 
the content of the selection procedure less resembles a work behavior, or the setting 
and manner of the administration of the selection procedure less resemble the work sit-
uation, or the result less resembles the work product, the less likely the selection pro-
cedure is to be content valid, and the greater the need for other evidence of validity. 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(4). Writing in 2005, class counsel in the on-going monitoring of the Cas-
tro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655, 666 (D. Mass. 1973) consent decree observed that “there has 
never been an effort to correlate the actual job performance of tenured police officers or firefight-
ers with their own scores on entry level examinations, a correlation that might or might not sup-
port the reliability of test scores as a predictor of performance.” Toni G. Wolfman, Background 
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originally required that the exam test for “all or nearly all important parts of 
the job,” and in proportion to the actual importance of the function,136 
courts like the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Lopez v. City of Lawrence 
are now upholding exams that admittedly test only small portions of the 
skills required of the position.137 
As one court admitted, validation is largely a matter of guesswork: “Of 
course, after this test is administered, post-test analysis of the job perfor-
mance of successful candidates will support or undermine a conclusion of 
ranking validity. But the task here is, as accurately as possible, to determine 
prospective validity.”138 In other words, any deficiencies inherent in the se-
lection process will show up only after the officer is already on the job. In 
all the years Boston has administered these exams, there has been no appar-
ent effort to “follow” the test-takers’ performance on the job to determine 
how predictive their scores actually were.139 
The classic illustration of content validity is a typing test, which direct-
ly demonstrates an applicant’s proficiency.140 In contrast, it is questionable 
if a test of one’s ability to memorize a police manual truly captures the 
complex tasks of a police supervisor. More enlightened decisions recognize 
the wide gap between job knowledge and job performance.141 
The courts have granted special deference to public safety employers 
in their use of multiple-choice exams, often finding them valid in the face of 
the obvious limitations of such devices, as illustrated by the Lopez litigation 
(discussed in the next Part) as well as by the Supreme Court’s “once-over-
easy” validation of the firefighter promotion exam in Ricci v. DeStefano in 
2009.142 In 2014, in Johnson v. City of Memphis, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                                           
Paper on Police and Firefighter Consent Decrees (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 136 United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 425–26 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing racial 
discrimination in fire department testing) (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) 
(1973)). 
 137 See Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lopez II), cert. denied 137 
S. Ct. 1088 (2017); see also infra notes 199–232 and accompanying text (discussing less discrimi-
natory alternatives). 
 138 Norwalk Guardian Ass’n v. Beres, 489 F. Supp. 849, 854 (D. Conn. 1980); see also Banos v. 
City of Chicago, 398 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing what is required to find validity). 
 139 See Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 736 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (“[T]here is no 
evidence to indicate that the City sought to measure the job performance of candidates who were 
promoted to sergeant such that some correlation between the test and job performance could be 
made.”) 
 140 See Banos, 398 F.3d at 893 (“A typing test for secretaries exemplifies this [content validi-
ty] kind of approach.”) 
 141 See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, 354 F. Supp. at 788. 
 142 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009); see Brodin, supra note 116, at 208–21 (discussing the deference 
the Supreme Court grants to public safety employers in their use of these tests). 
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Appeals made this explicit: “When the employment position involves pub-
lic safety, we accord greater latitude to the employer’s showing of job-
relatedness and business necessity.”143 But is it not precisely in these crucial 
positions where selection of the best qualified candidates is most urgent? 
The harm to minority candidates is all the greater when scores are used 
(as they routinely are) for rank ordering, thus excluding even passers unless 
they are high enough on the eligible list to be reached. The Lopez court 
acknowledged the “marked disparate impact because the selection rates of 
Black and Hispanic officers for promotion to sergeant were so much lower 
than the selection rates of the other officers that we can fairly exclude ran-
dom chance as the explanation for the difference.”144 In Boston, the 2008 
exam produced a mere two promotions out of thirty-seven for minority can-
didates.145 Scores were more than 6.5 points lower on average for non-white 
takers.146 
Yet courts have given short shrift to the additional requirement of a 
showing “that a higher score on a content valid selection procedure is likely 
to result in better job performance” before “the results may be used to rank 
persons who score above minimum levels.”147 Justice William Brennan long 
ago criticized public employers’ stubborn reliance on insignificant differ-
ences in civil service scores to make hiring and promotion decisions, often 
to the detriment of woman and minorities.148 
                                                                                                                           
 143 770 F.3d 464, 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “We recognize that a police depart-
ment’s selection of testing criteria is largely a matter within the professional judgment of the test 
writer based upon the particular attributes of the job in question.” Id. This lax scrutiny was first 
reflected in Beazer v. Transit Authority, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1977), and Spurlock v. United Air-
lines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 144 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 111. Used merely as “a pass/fail screening device,” the exams would 
have less disparate impact. See id. at 111, 117. 
145 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 17, Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 
No. 07-11693-GAO (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I). 
 146 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 110; Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 69, 
Lopez I, No. 07-11693-GAO. 
 147 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 118. “The use of a ranking device requires a separate demonstration 
that there is a relationship between higher scores and better job performance.” Lopez I, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *16–17. The EEOC Guidelines, provide: “Evidence which may be suffi-
cient to support the use of a selection procedure on a pass/fail (screening) basis may be insuffi-
cient to support the use of the same procedure on a ranking basis under these guidelines.” 29 
C.F.R. § 1607.5(G) (2018). Civil Service law requiring employers to promote in rank order is, of 
course, trumped by Title VII to the extent it produces a discriminatory result. See Smith, 144 F. 
Supp. 3d at 210–11 (explaining that Title VII defeats civil service law where that law may allow 
for discrimination). 
 148 In 1987, in Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, a male applicant complained 
that he was the victim of reverse discrimination when his employer promoted a female with a civil 
service score of 73 over his score of 75. 480 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1987). Justice Brennan observed: 
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At best, the validation status quo requires disappointed minorities 
seeking advancement to challenge each successive test administration, bear-
ing the burden of securing counsel for lengthy litigation and a battle of test 
experts.149 The Sixth Circuit lamented regarding the Memphis Police De-
partment that “[a]fter more than thirteen years of litigation, including a 
bench trial, numerous preliminary injunctions, and a previous appeal affirm-
ing the grant of injunctive relief for some plaintiffs, three consolidated cases 
challenging the City of Memphis’s police promotional processes as racially 
discriminatory return on cross-appeals.”150 Lopez I was filed in 2007, took 
eighteen days to try in 2010, was not decided by the trial judge until 2014, 
and was finally resolved by the First Circuit against the plaintiffs in 2016.151 
                                                                                                                           
 Justice Scalia’s dissent predicts that today’s decision will loose a flood of “less 
qualified” minorities and women upon the work force . . . . [That speculation] ig-
nores the fact that “[i]t is a standard tenet of personnel administration that there is 
rarely a single, ‘best qualified’ person for a job. An effective personnel system will 
bring before the selecting official several fully-qualified candidates who each may 
possess different attributes which recommend them for selection. [F]inal determina-
tions as to which candidate is ‘best qualified’ are at best subjective.” This case pro-
vides an example of precisely this point. Any differences in qualifications between 
Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the least. 
Id. at 641 n.17 (quoting Brief for the American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616, 1986 WL 728160). Both Professor Selmi 
and I have noted how “remarkable” it is that the two-point test score differential could be thought 
to tell us anything meaningful about the qualifications of these candidates. See Brodin, supra note 
116, at 229–30, 230 n.464; Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirm-
ative Action Debate, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1995). 
 149 See Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 1991, at A1 (documenting the difficulties of retaining counsel in cases challenging 
exams that require expert witnesses and considerable up-front money, and with relatively low 
success rates). 
 150 Johnson, 770 F.3d at 467. Judgment for the plaintiff officers was reversed on the determi-
nation that they had failed to demonstrate equally valid less discriminatory alternatives to the 
promotional process. Id. at 477–78. 
 151 See infra notes 199–232 and accompanying text. Michael Meltsner relates the tale of a 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund challenge brought to a statewide test in New York that was dispro-
portionately excluding black and Puerto Rican teachers from achieving permanent status as prin-
cipals, notwithstanding their successful performance in an acting capacity. MICHAEL MELTSNER, 
THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 167–69 (2006). The tests had little to do with prospects 
for success on the job, and much to do with the coaching available to white applicants from their 
white colleagues. “Challenging the tests for over six years consumed [plaintiff’s attorney] and her 
team of lawyers and consultants.” Id. She began the litigation as a junior attorney, and before it 
was over she had left the office, become director of another public interest legal center, and joined 
the Harvard Law Faculty. The courts finally halted the testing, and when promotions were made 
on the basis of job performance evaluations, the percentage of minority principals rose from twen-
ty-eight percent to forty-two percent. Id. 
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Similarly, litigation challenging the FDNY’s testing regime dragged on for a 
full decade.152 
Validation has become a hyper-technical enterprise, completely reliant 
on retained (and well-compensated) psychometricians, statisticians, and 
industrial psychologists. District court judges must choose between oppos-
ing credentialed experts pontificating in the arcane “science” of test con-
struction and reliability.153 One judge, in view of the complexity of the is-
sues, found it necessary to appoint a Special Master to assess the challenged 
exam and oversee the development of a new one.154 Another candidly 
acknowledged the unavoidable judicial deference granted the experts: “This 
court will not substitute its less qualified judgment for that of the profes-
sionals herein involved.”155 
The end result is police departments like Boston’s, with largely all-
white managerial ranks occupied by officers chosen not for their superviso-
ry skills, but their memorization abilities—all with a chilling effect on po-
tential minority applicants for promotion.156 
V. LOPEZ V. CITY OF LAWRENCE AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE 
VALIDATION APPROACH 
Lopez v. City of Lawrence is emblematic of the troubled regime of test-
ing challenges.157 Underscoring the rote memorization character of the chal-
lenged eighty question closed-book exam, each multiple-choice either quot-
ed directly or paraphrased the texts on the reading list distributed to appli-
cants. The questions were drafted not by experts, but by a layperson at the 
Human Resources Division (Civil Service).158 Yet the District Court (af-
firmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals) upheld it as “minimally valid,” 
whatever that means. 
Reducing the already low bar of content validation (as discussed in the 
previous Part), the district judge construed the modest defense burden as fol-
                                                                                                                           
 152 See GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 1. 
 153 In a rare Daubert challenge, in 2000, the Seventh Circuit in Bryant v. City of Chicago 
found the testing expert’s testimony met the standards for reliability. Bryant, 200 F.3d 1092, 
1097–98 (7th Cir. 2000). See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
(defining a trial court judge’s gatekeeping role under Fed. R. Evid. 702). 
 154 United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 155 Norwalk Guardians Ass’n, 489 F. Supp. at 854. 
 156 See GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 235 (discussing the prejudicial results of these examina-
tions). 
 157 No. 07-11693-GAO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I), 
aff’d, 823 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lopez II), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1088 (2017). 
 158 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Rulings of Law at 35, Lopez I, No. 07-11693-
GAO. 
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lows: “[T]he essence of validity [is that it] allow[s] one to predict at a level 
great[er] than—significantly greater than chance as to how well someone 
will perform.”159 The exam, in other words, has to beat a flipped coin. 
The defense expert conceded at trial that the exam did not satisfy even 
this standard, as it addressed approximately half of those abilities identified 
as key to the job of sergeant.160 Critical skills “essential to the position, such 
as leadership, decision making, interpersonal relations, and the like” were 
admittedly beyond the capabilities of the written exam to measure.161 He 
further readily concurred in plaintiffs’ position that an assessment center 
that evaluated a candidate’s “interpersonal skills through observed social 
interaction, or some kind of device for measuring an applicant’s oral com-
munication skills” would have been far preferable.162 
Nonetheless, he insisted that the “education & experience” (“E & E”) 
component (which actually accounted for only five to seven percent of the 
candidate’s score) somehow pushed the selection process into the “minimal-
ly valid” and “acceptable” range.163 This suspect conclusion was reached 
notwithstanding his acknowledgement that the E & E merely awarded 
points for years in rank, a minimum of which all candidates had to have to 
be eligible for the exam, and for courses taken, which again most candidates 
could check off.164 As the First Circuit put it (in an understatement): 
  This is not to say that [the defense expert’s] testimony trum-
peted a wholehearted endorsement of the scheme used by Boston 
to identify candidates for promotion. [The defense expert] agreed 
with the Officers that the validity of the Boston examination 
could have been improved, perhaps by incorporating a “well-
developed assessment center” to evaluate an officer’s interper-
sonal skills through observed social interaction, or some kind of 
device for measuring an applicant’s oral communication skills. 
[The defense expert] was clear that his opinion solely concerned 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *49 (quoting defense expert) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 160 Id. at *54. 
 161 Id. at *60. 
 162 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 113; Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *61. 
 163 Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *60. 
 164 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 113. “The level and extent of work and educational experience and 
accomplishments listed by each applicant,” the expert testified, “served as a useful, if imperfect, 
proxy for the kinds of qualities that were deemed to be important to a sergeant’s daily responsibili-
ties.” Id. He conceded that the gain in validity from the E & E was “only marginal.” Id. 
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the selection device’s compliance with his profession’s minimum 
standards as translated into the EEOC’s Guidelines.165 
Based on this testimony the challenged exams were deemed “minimal-
ly valid”—i.e., they “reliably predict[ed] a candidate’s suitability for the 
job, such that persons who perform better under the test methods are likely 
to perform better on the job.”166 Stating the obvious, that “knowledge of the 
constitutional and regulatory law applicable to police work is critical to a 
police sergeant’s ability to effectively perform as a supervisor,”167 the mat-
ter of the other missing critical skills identified by the defense expert was 
dismissed, as well as the unaddressed matter of whether memorization of 
texts was a meaningful indicator of such knowledge. 
Taking refuge in the clear error standard, the First Circuit affirmed.168 
Its half-hearted endorsement of the exams as predictors of success as a po-
lice supervisor, and in strict rank order of score, is reflected in its startlingly 
low bar—the exams were “better predictors of success than would be 
achieved by random selection.”169 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id. The very same expert, retained by plaintiffs, came to the opposite conclusion when he 
criticized rank-ordered hiring from a similar exam used by another department. See Bridgeport 
Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1142–43 (2d Cir. 1991). He was similarly 
critical of the process in the New Haven Fire Department. See Brief of Industrial-Organizational 
Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 
(2009) (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328), 2009 WL 796281. Dr. Outtz has acknowledged that cognitive 
examinations are largely irrelevant in predicting job performance. See Outtz & Newman, supra 
note 118, at 55. 
 166 Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *61. The District Judge found further evidence 
of validity in the fact that incumbent sergeants who took the lieutenant’s exam, which shared fifty-
three common questions with the sergeants’ exam, did significantly better on those questions than 
the entry-level patrol officers. Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 118–19; Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
124139, at *56–57. Attributing this to the relation between the questions and job performance, the 
district judge missed the more obvious explanation—that the incumbent sergeants had secured 
their promotions by doing well on the very same exam. Job knowledge exams are most useful at 
predicting success on other job knowledge exams. Another questionable basis for the finding of 
validity is that, as the E & E measures years on the job, it “is generally recognized [that seniority 
is] relevant to the ability to perform well in a supervisory position such as sergeant.” Lopez I, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *59. It is not surprising that there is no source cited for this proposi-
tion, as seniority does not automatically assure successful job performance. See Mark S. Brodin, 
The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 
62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 975–85 (1984) [hereinafter Brodin, The Role of Fault]. Nor is there any 
support for the District Court’s bizarre conclusion that officers who had taught courses “evidenced 
oral communication skills important to the position of sergeant.” Lopez I, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
124139, at *60. With no indication as to the success of the teaching, no conclusions as to oral 
skills could reasonably be drawn. 
 167 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 115. 
 168 Id. at 122. 
 169 Id. at 116–17. 
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Judge Torruella parted company with the majority. Recognizing that the 
exams did not test for the “critical knowledge, skills, and abilities (“KSAs”) 
necessary to qualify for the position of police sergeant,” he disputed that the 
E & E could somehow elevate the process: “As the majority concedes, this 
component had a minimal effect on score.”170 In fact, “[t]he E & E compo-
nent that purportedly compensated for the . . . deficit, edging the exams into 
the realm of validity, consisted of a single sheet requiring candidates to 
bubble in responses as to length of work experience in departmental posi-
tions by rank, educational background, and teaching experience.”171 “The 
exams here may have tested the knowledge a supervisor must have,” Judge 
Torruella observed, “but omitted any meaningful test of supervisory skill, 
which is unquestionably essential to the position of police sergeant.”172 
Concluding that the District Court committed “clear error in finding 
that the challenged tests were valid when placed under the legal prism of 
Title VII,” Judge Torruella cautioned that this would be “a perilous prece-
dent that all but encourages corner cutting when it comes to Title VII.”173 
Lopez is far from an outlier. A job knowledge test used by the Jackson 
Mississippi Police Department for promotion to sergeant was deemed con-
tent valid notwithstanding the finding that it could evaluate only “two of the 
twelve dimensions [technical knowledge and legal knowledge] identified in 
the job analysis.”174 The defense expert conceded that a more stringent cri-
terion validation would have been preferable, comparing test performance 
to job performance, but that such study was not feasible.175 The exam had 
not been evaluated before its administration by subject matter experts, as 
was the usual protocol, and eight of the ninety-nine questions had to be dis-
counted after the test was administered because they were later found to be 
defective.176 
The Jackson exam had a conceded disparate impact—it excluded all but 
twenty-one of the 106 black candidates, foreclosing them from proceeding to 
the second and third stages, simulation exercises and a structured interview.177 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Id. at 124 (Torruella, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 125 (emphasis added). Judge Torruella noted that “[w]ritten tests of supervisory skill 
have been found by other courts to be altogether inadequate to evaluate that attribute.” Id.; see 
Vulcan Pioneers v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 625 F. Supp. 527, 547 (D.N.J. 1985), aff’d, 832 F.2d 
811 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 
513 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 173 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 122, 125. 
 174 Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 735 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 175 Id. at 737. 
 176 Id. at 739–40. 
 177 Id. at 731. 
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Minorities tend to have more success there, and those devices are viewed as 
more job related.178 Cost concern was the ostensible justification for limiting 
the group going into the final stages of the process.179 Plaintiffs’ claim that the 
City’s reliance on the test results in the face of their discriminatory conse-
quences raised an inference of intentional discrimination was dismissed.180 
In Johnson v. City of Memphis in 2014, defendant’s testing expert ad-
mitted that the best approach to determining reliability would have been by 
testing and then retesting.181 Because that was not feasible, all he did was 
measure the tests’ internal consistency, but even that produced poor reliabil-
ity scores. The results also showed considerable bunching of scores, sepa-
rated by only one point, putting the validity of rank order selection in seri-
ous issue. The best that could be said was that the exam “was able to differ-
entiate between those candidates with more job knowledge from those with 
less knowledge.”182 The court nonetheless validated the exam, placing con-
siderable reliance upon the testing industry’s own publications and stand-
ards,183 notwithstanding the self-serving nature of such validation. 
In sum, federal judges seem quite willing to stamp approval of flawed 
devices,184 and are not deterred even where the test itself has been destroyed 
by the employer and thus can no longer be evaluated.185 
To be sure, some courts have held police departments to more exacting 
standards of validation. In 2015, as noted above, U.S. District of Massachu-
setts Judge William Young evaluated a promotional exam very similar to the 
one upheld in Lopez and reached the opposite conclusion in Smith v. City of 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Id. at 741. For the experience of the Bridgeport fire department, where minorities excelled 
on the oral interviews, see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 614 (2009) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
 179 Hearn, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 735, 742. 
 180 Id. 
 181 770 F.3d 464, 479 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 182 Id. at 484 (emphasis added). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See M.O.C.H.A. Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 689 F.3d 263, 263 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding 
the challenged fire promotional exams to be job-related despite the fact that job analysis was 
based on statewide, and not citywide, assessment of job tasks); Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 
F.3d 1092, 1092 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding rank-order promotions to lieutenant based on an initial 
qualifying job-knowledge test consisting of 150 multiple-choice questions, all derived from source 
materials, despite its severe disparate impact); Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Colum-
bus, 916 F.2d 1092, 1092 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding the lieutenant’s examination notwithstanding 
the fact that it measured officers’ knowledge and not their potential performance, that the skills 
tested were not tested in proportion to how they would be utilized on job, and that one third of the 
questions were taken from a textbook not assigned). 
 185 See Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 928 F. Supp. 1494, 1509–10 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“The 
fact that the test was unavailable is therefore insufficient to invalidate the showing that the City 
has made. The Court is thus satisfied that the City has carried its burden of production as to a 
business justification for the examination.”) 
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Boston.186 At issue was the Boston’s lieutenants’ exam, consisting of 100 
multiple-choice questions and the same E & E rating used in Lopez. Many 
of the questions were identical to those that appeared in the sergeant’s ex-
am. After a bench trial, Judge Young found the exam had a racially dispar-
ate impact,187 compounded by rank ordering,188 and was not sufficiently 
job-related to survive Title VII scrutiny.189 The court explained: 
[T]he evidence does not support the necessary inference that those 
who perform better on the exam will be better performers on the 
job, primarily because the exam did not test a sufficient range of 
KSAs [it only tested job knowledge], and there was no evidence 
that the exam was reliable enough to justify its use for rank order-
ing.190  
Ignored were critical “interpersonal skills, presentation skills, reason-
ing and judgment skills, oral communication skills, analytical skills, ability 
to give constructive criticism, ability to speak in front of groups, ability to 
counsel subordinates, ability to counsel and comfort families of victims, and 
ability to make sound decisions quickly.”191 
Judge Young’s colleague, District Judge Patti Saris, similarly found in 
Bradley v. City of Lynn that the cognitive ability examination for entry-level 
firefighter positions violated Title VII by causing severe disparate impact 
without the justification of job relation—such exams, she observed, “have a 
relatively low correlation with overall job performance.”192 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Nash v. Consol-
idated City of Jacksonville took a skeptical view of Jacksonville’s multiple-
                                                                                                                           
 186 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 177 (D. Mass. 2015). Judge Young reaffirmed his decision in July 
2017, in light of Lopez II. See Smith v. City of Boston, 267 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 187 On the 2005 exam, the passing rate for minorities was 50%, and for whites, 88%; just one 
black and one Hispanic candidate were promoted. On the 2008 exam, the passing rate for minori-
ties was 69%, and for whites was 94%; only 5 of 33 promotions went to blacks. Smith, 144 F. 
Supp. 3d at 190–91. 
 188 Id. at 199–200, 208–10. 
 189 Id. at 180–81. 
 190 Id. at 203. “If a test only examines knowledge . . . while ignoring a broad swath of neces-
sary skills and abilities, it hardly seems plausible that a higher score is likely to result in higher job 
performance, or even that the procedure measures aspects that differentiate among levels of job 
performance.” Id. at 209. 
 191 Id. at 207–08. The Massachusetts state courts reached a similar conclusion when a multi-
ple-choice exam for police lieutenants was found not to meet the Civil Service mandate that the 
test measure the necessary supervisory skills. See Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed’n v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 624 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
 192 Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 173 (D. Mass. 2006); see also Firefighters 
Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is no good 
pen and paper test for evaluating supervisory skills.”). 
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choice examination for promotion to fire lieutenant, as no questions related 
to supervisory skills. 193 The test failed to address the one key aspect that 
differentiated the job of firefighter from fire lieutenant—the supervisor’s 
job requires “complex behaviors, good interpersonal skills, the ability to 
make decisions under tremendous pressure, and a host of other abilities—
none of which is easily measured by a written, multiple-choice test.”194 
Perhaps the closest scrutiny of such a test occurred in in 1989 in 
Hamer v. City of Atlanta,195 in which the Eleventh Circuit examined a crite-
rion-related concurrent validation study196 that correlated test scores with on 
the job performance ratings for the fire lieutenants and captains. The test 
was administered to candidates only after the study was completed. 
There are many alternatives to job knowledge tests. Chicago is not 
alone in now using a multi-component process that follows the test with an 
“In-Basket Exercise” based on hypothetical reports that a candidate might 
face on the job, requiring assessment of the situation and assignments to 
officers, and then an oral briefing exercise intended to demonstrate analyti-
cal abilities and communication skills, simulating a roll call. 197 This ap-
proach has obviously more potential to identify effective supervisors and 
leaders. It is reported that over two-thirds of U.S. municipalities now rely 
on selection methods other than, or in addition to, paper-and-pencil tests.198 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Nash v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1535 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 194 Id. at 1538; see also Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 414 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that “the written test did not approximate a candidate’s potential job performance” as a police 
lieutenant); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 58 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] selection procedure 
that ranks only on the basis of [cognitive ability test] scores is not acceptable.”); Vulcan, 832 F.2d 
at 812 (finding that the challenged job-knowledge test rewarded test-taking ability rather than the 
knowledges, abilities, and skills necessary for the position, and focused on a candidate’s ability to 
recall data from particular texts rather than his actual knowledge or abilities). 
 195 872 F.2d 1521, 1521 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 196 The Eleventh Circuit explained:  
 At the heart of criterion-related validity is the statistical correlation between per-
formance on the test and objective measures or ‘criterions’ of performance on the 
job. This is measured in one of two ways. In a ‘predictive’ study, all applicants for a 
position are given the examination. Those applicants selected for the position are al-
lowed to work at the job for a period of time and their job performance is then 
measured. Their preemployment test scores are then compared to their job perfor-
mance ratings. In a second method, known as ‘concurrent’ validation, the test is ad-
ministered to existing employees and their scores are compared to their job perfor-
mance.  
Id. at 1525. 
 197 Bryant, 200 F.3d at 1096–97; see Banos v. City of Chicago, 398 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 
2005) (explaining Chicago’s use of assessment exercises); Brown v. City of Chicago, 8 F. Supp. 
2d 1095, 1109–10 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (detailing Chicago’s in-basket exercise). 
 198 Andrea A. Curcio et al., Testing, Diversity, and Merit: A Reply to Dan Subotnik and Oth-
ers, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 206, 219 (2014). 
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But can such alternatives be judicially imposed on reluctant depart-
ments? This question is explored in the next Part. 
VI. LESS DISCRIMINATORY ALTERNATIVES 
It would be next to impossible to find a responsible testing expert, or 
police chief, who would fully underwrite the sole or even primary use of a 
job knowledge test to select police supervisors in strict rank order of scores 
(where missing one or two correct answers may translate into dropping hun-
dreds of places), 199 particularly given the many alternatives to these exams. 
Indeed, the very same expert used by the defendants in Lopez v. City of 
Lawrence to defend the singular use of the exam, when previously retained 
by the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, constructed a selection process in 
which the exam counted for only about half of the candidate’s total score.200 
Dr. Outtz combined the multiple-choice device with an oral component de-
signed to test for the actual skills required by a sergeant on the job. Video 
simulations of crime scenes would be projected onto a screen, after which 
the candidate would indicate how he or she would respond to the events 
depicted. “Though recognizing that video simulations would be more ex-
pensive than the traditional tests, Dr. Outtz urged the substitution in order to 
improve the examination and to reduce the possibility of its adverse impact 
on minority candidates.”201 The mayor, however, refused to authorize the 
funds for the video portion.202 
When the written test went forward, the passing rate for black candi-
dates was less than one-half (30% compared with 68%) the rate for 
whites.203 Hispanics passed at only 46%.204 All nineteen promotions went to 
white candidates, the highest scorers. Dr. Outtz opposed the strict rank-
order selections, concluding that “certain differences in test scores may not 
be significant.”205 He recommended that selections be made instead by 
“banding” (or grouping) the scores, permitting promotions on the basis of 
other factors including race or ethnicity, gender, work experience, and past 
job performance.206 (After reviewing the final scores from the 2008 exam, 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See, e.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 234. 
 200 Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1142–43 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 201 Id. at 1143. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 1144. Banding has worked effectively to diversify public safety agencies like the San 
Francisco Fire Dept. See GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 269 (discussing the use of banding); Kim-
berly West-Faulcon, Fairness Feuds: Competing Conceptions of Title VII Discriminatory Testing, 
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Boston’s test consultant similarly recommended, unsuccessfully, banding 
the results in nine-point increments).207 When Bridgeport refused, minority 
plaintiffs sued. The District Court found in their favor, finding a Title VII 
violation because banding scores would be a less discriminatory alternative 
(“LDA”) that would achieve the same quality of selections. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.208 
LDA is a concept originating in case law209 and codified in the 1991 
Amendments to Title VII.210 Even if an employer meets the burden of prov-
ing that its devices are job related, “it remains open to the complaining par-
ty to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesir-
able racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘ef-
ficient and trustworthy workmanship.’”211 It fits neatly within Title VII’s 
balance of interests of employer and employee212 in that it seeks to achieve 
the former’s goals with the least injury to the latter’s right to equal oppor-
tunity.213 LDA also puts to the test an employer’s claim that the challenged 
device is essential to its operations. 
One writer has aptly summarized the significance of the concept: 
“[E]mployment testing is legal and permissible only if the test[’s] dispro-
portionate exclusion on the basis of a protected trait is unavoidable. . . . 
[The] statute incentivizes the use of the least discriminatory selection pro-
cedure that accomplishes the employer’s selection needs.”214 
                                                                                                                           
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1076–77 (2011) (discussing the benefits of using banding to 
evaluate candidates in relation to test scores). 
 207 Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 191 (D. Mass. 2015); see also Bradley v. 
City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 174 (D. Mass. 2006) (“As all experts agree, there is no ration-
al, statistically valid basis for distinguishing between candidates within a band of eight points 
because of the examination’s reliability. A score of 100 is thus no different from a score of 92 in 
predicting job performance.”) 
 208 Bridgeport Guardians, 933 F.2d at 1142. 
 209 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (explaining the origin of a 
less discriminatory alternative (“LDA”) selection device). 
 210 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2012). See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Dis-
parate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 
473 (1999) (discussing the amendments to Title VII). 
 211 Moody, 422 U.S. at 425. 
 212 See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title 
VII and the Return to ‘No Cause’ Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1212 (2003) (discussing the 
balance of interests behind Title VII). 
 213 One Title VII scholar has suggested that plaintiffs be permitted to skip entirely the job 
relation/business necessity stage of the impact case, and upon a showing of disparate impact, pro-
ceed directly to demonstrating less discriminatory alternatives. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS 
BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE 107–09 (1998). 
 214 West-Faulcon, supra note 206, at 1046 (emphasis added). 
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There is no shortage of attractive alternatives to the job knowledge 
test.215 Perhaps most promising is an assessment center that confronts can-
didates with real-world situations and allows them “to demonstrate [before 
multiple assessors] how they would address a particular problem as opposed 
to just verbally saying it or identifying the correct option on a written 
test.”216 This represents a shift from cognitive to competency testing.217 Sev-
eral localities use these devices as a supplement to the written test.218 As-
sessment centers are widely recognized as more reliable predictors of job 
success, and especially better able to identify and measure leadership capac-
ity, problem-solving skills, and command presence.219 The holistic approach 
has been found to produce less adverse impact on minorities.220 
But courts have been reluctant to impose alternative selection practices 
on law enforcement or public safety agencies.221 Noting that assessment 
center exercises “can require considerably more resources to administer, 
including both money and personnel, and thus can be cumbersome and ex-
pensive,” the District Court declined to mandate them in Lopez v. Lawrence 
in 2014.222 Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                           
 215 Personality and life experience tests are two further alternatives in addition to those listed 
here. See Bradley, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 174 n.16-17. 
 216 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 570 (2009). 
 217 Ronald A. Ash, et al., The Practice of Competency Modeling, 53 PERS. PSYCHOL. 703, 
711 (2000). 
 218 Riccucci & Riccardelli, supra note 3, at 352. 
 219 See Floyd Delon, Assessment Center Screenings for School Administration Certification 
and Employment: Possible Legal Challenges, 43 ED. L. REP. 841 (1988) (examining the use of 
assessment centers in school administration hiring); Charles Hale, Assessment Centers, LAW & 
ORDER, Feb. 1, 2005, at 22 (discussing the effectiveness of assessment centers); Chris Williams, 
Video Assessments Gain Ground as Way to Grade Future Teachers, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2010, at 
A4 (discussing the success of assessment centers in education hiring); Brief of Industrial-
Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4–5, 28–33, DeStefa-
no, 557 U.S. 557 (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328), 2009 WL 796281 (discussing the use of assessment 
centers). 
 220 See GEORGE C. THORNTON & DEBORAH E. RUPP, ASSESSMENT CENTERS IN HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 15 (2006) (“Assessment centers predict future success, do not cause 
adverse impact, and are seen as fair by participants.”); HERMAN AGUINIS & WAYNE F. CASCIO, 
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 372 (6th ed. 2005) (“[R]esearch has 
demonstrated that adverse impact is less of a problem in an [assessment center] as compared to an 
aptitude test.”); Ellen Zweig, Challenges to Employment Testing Under Title VII: Creating “Built 
In Headwinds” for the Civil Service Employer, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 748 (1984) (noting 
how holistic approaches help avoid equal protection challenges). 
 221 It has been observed that “[a]fter all . . . if the employer . . . could implement an alternative 
practice that serves its needs as cheaply as the original practice but with less discriminatory im-
pact, would it not have done so initially, to avoid the expense of litigation?” Theodore Y. Blumoff 
& Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory 
Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 42 (1990). 
 222 No. 07-11693-GAO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *65 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) 
(Lopez I), aff’d, 823 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lopez II), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1088 (2017); see 
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its “own review of the record does disclose testimony convincingly estab-
lishing that, as a general matter, incorporation of selection tools such as use 
of ‘hurdles,’ banding, oral interviews, so-called assessment centers, and 
open ended ‘situational judgment’ questions generally tend to result in less 
adverse impact than does a reliance on multiple choice exams,” it nonethe-
less affirmed the District Court’s ruling, explaining: 
Boston’s prior attempt to employ assessment centers with situa-
tional exercises and oral questioning in its 2002 promotional ex-
am resulted in a cost of $1.2 million to develop the exam and the 
required “transporting, housing, and training a substantial number 
of police officers from throughout the country who acted as the 
assessors,” without generating any convincing support that re-
peating such an approach in 2005 or 2008 would have reduced 
adverse impact. In concluding that the City was not required to 
again incur such costs without any demonstration that adverse 
impact would be materially reduced, the district court acted well 
within its discretion in making the judgments called for by the 
applicable law. Factors such as the cost or other burdens of pro-
posed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining 
whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged 
practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business goals.223 
Another cautionary tale can be found in the experience of Memphis, 
Tennessee where in 2014, in Johnson v. City of Memphis, the District Court 
found that plaintiffs had met the burden of demonstrating equally valid less 
discriminatory alternatives to the job knowledge test used by the police de-
partment, particularly a role-playing exercise that required candidates to 
respond to simulated law enforcement scenarios, and had been validated and 
                                                                                                                           
also Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 928 F. Supp. 1494, 1512 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“[A] proposed 
alternative that represents a substantial financial and time burden [like an assessment center] does 
not constitute an equally effective alternative.”) 
 223 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 121 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 998 
(1988) (“Factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are 
relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in 
serving the employer’s legitimate business goals.”)); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 
F.3d 469, 481 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing the potential use of less discriminatory alternatives); 
Davey v. City of Omaha, 107 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that costs and other burdens 
may be weighed when making an LDA determination). Boston had two false starts with assess-
ment centers. In 1987, an assessment center consisting of in-basket exercise, a video performance 
exercise, and a leaderless group exercise, was abandoned when information about it was leaked. In 
1992, another assessment device was scuttled when a group of white officers filed an action chal-
lenging the promotion of minorities with lower written test scores. See Mass. Ass’n of Minority 
Police Officers v. Abban, 748 N.E.2d 455, 457–58 (Mass. 2001). 
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used with success before.224 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged “that the existence of such alternative measures and methods belies . . . 
Defendants’ position that they had no choice but to go forward with the 
2002 promotion process despite its adverse impact because no alternative 
methods with less adverse impact were available.”225 But it nonetheless 
overturned the lower court’s ruling because of security concerns with the 
simulations—leaked information and candidate coaching compromised both 
prior administrations.226 The trial judge was found to have also ignored “the 
City’s concern regarding the impracticability of the 1996 simulation, which 
required numerous actors to portray the two-hour law enforcement scenari-
os and took nearly three months to evaluate more than 400 applicants.”227 
Costs and logistical burdens thus inhibit the practicality of LDAs, se-
verely limiting their use.228 The Supreme Court has also cautioned that 
“[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure busi-
ness practices.”229 “[C]onsequently, the judiciary should proceed with care 
before mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s alternative se-
lection or hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit.”230 
Although Title VII has thus not proven effective in imposing LDAs on 
reluctant police departments, the concept itself evidences an important in-
sight: Employers are legally required, where their selection devices disad-
vantage minorities, and even if they can validate them to the satisfaction of 
a court, to utilize alternatives that can achieve their goals with less discrim-
inatory effect. As the Second Circuit has recognized, where an employer 
refuses to consider effective alternatives and persists in utilizing selection 
devices with adverse impact, that will “belie a claim . . . that [its] incumbent 
practices are being employed for non-discriminatory reasons.”231 Should 
that employer not be adjudged to be intentionally discriminating? 
As originally conceived, the premise behind the LDA concept was in-
deed one of intentional discrimination:  
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests 
are “job related,” it remains open to the complaining party to 
show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly un-
                                                                                                                           
 224 770 F.3d 464, 476–78 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 81 (2015). 
 225 Id. at 473. 
 226 Id. at 474. 
227 Id. at 465. 
 228 Id. at 474–75 (collecting cases). 
 229 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (citing Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
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desirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate 
interest in “efficient and trustworthy workmanship.” Such a show-
ing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests mere-
ly as a “pretext” for discrimination. 232 
Tort law would bring the same result, as set out in the next Part. 
VII. FASHIONING A NEW THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION— 
FORESEEABLE ADVERSE IMPACT EQUALS INTENT 
As U.S. District Judge Charles Wyzanski ruled many years ago: “In-
asmuch as the [police] civil service examinations were not job related and 
were discriminatory against the plaintiffs, any state or city official, who in-
nocently or otherwise, used the results of those examinations to deprive a 
plaintiff of a job opportunity deprived him of the equal protection of the 
laws.”233 What about exams that are deemed validated (by the low bar de-
scribed above), but used with the knowledge and expectation that minorities 
will be pushed aside? 
Judge Young began his opinion in Smith v. City of Boston (as discussed 
above) by emphasizing “this is not a case about conscious racial prejudice. 
Rather, the Plaintiffs’ case is rooted in their allegation that the seemingly 
benign multiple-choice examination promotion process, while facially neu-
tral, was slanted in favor of white candidates.”234 The outcome, however, 
was the functional equivalent of deliberate discrimination—the exclusion of 
nearly all minorities from consideration for promotion. 
Under the current regime, as set out above, the fate of groups who 
have long suffered exclusion from supervisory positions hinges on the rare-
fied air of psychometrics and statistics. Given that most judges are un-
schooled in such matters, and may not even see the challenged exams them-
selves in the course of the litigation,235 results depend largely on the persua-
                                                                                                                           
 232 Moody, 422 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added); see also Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 
36–37 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the refusal of the Boston Police Department to adopt a viable 
less discriminatory alternative to challenged hair drug test may constitute a finding of intentional 
discrimination); Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 221, at 42–43. 
 233 Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 943 (D. Mass. 1971) (emphasis added), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). Judge Wyzanski compared Massachusetts’s low rate of 
minority participation with that of other communities more successful in employing minority 
officers, blaming Civil Service for “over-emphasizing scholastic skills, paper and pencil capaci-
ties, and performance in tests” with little if any ability to predict job performance. Castro v. Bee-
cher, 365 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Mass. 1973) (on remand). 
 234 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 180; see also Lopez v. City of Lawrence, No. 07-11693-GAO, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124139, at *9–10 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2014) (Lopez I), aff’d, 823 F.3d 102 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (Lopez II), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1088 (2017). 
 235 See Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 928 F. Supp. 1494, 1509–10 n.174 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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siveness of the opposing experts and the resources the parties can put be-
hind them. 
As neither the modest requirements for validation nor the obligation to 
use less discriminatory alternatives has proven a reliable means of redress 
from the scourge of job knowledge tests, I propose that Title VII should find 
liability and impose appropriate remedies in cases like Lopez v. City of Law-
rence where repeated use236 of the same exclusionary devices predictably 
stifles minority advancement over the long term. Justification can be found 
in: 1) the inference that the foreseeable discriminatory results are intend-
ed;237 2) recognition that such repetitive conduct is, at the very least, negli-
gent;238 or 3) disparate impact theory writ large—i.e., to protect against the 
persistence of macro-built-in-headwinds against minority advancement. 
Application of the widely recognized concept in tort and criminal 
law—that an actor intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of its 
actions, and that where he believes the consequences are substantially cer-
tain to follow, he intends those consequences239—would treat selection 
                                                                                                                           
 236 “An important reason that the law focuses on the frequency of injury associated with cer-
tain kinds of conduct lies in the value of predictability. That ability to predict the likelihood of a 
type of event has an obvious relation to fairness concerns.” MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLE OF 
TORT LAW § 19.02(c), 107 (3d ed. 2010).  
 237 As Catherine E. Smith has perceptively observed, the “evolving recognition of discrimina-
tory harms should continue to include the developments in our understanding of how discrimina-
tion operates . . . .” Catherine E. Smith, Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks of Workplace Dis-
crimination, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1207, 1209 (2014). 
 238 It has been suggested that “the employer may be held liable for its negligence in failing to 
consider all of the possible ways to make a certain decision.” Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Dis-
crimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 99 (2011); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Neg-
ligent Discrimination, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 899, 967 (1993). Negligence is of course the basis for 
employer liability in sexual harassment cases. See Sperino, supra, at 111–12 (discussing the role 
of negligence in harassment cases). 
 239 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 8, at 32 (3d ed. 1964); id. § 9, at 302 
(“Where a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would believe that a particular result was 
substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with . . . as though he intended it.”); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The word ‘intent’ is used 
throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote that the actor desires the consequences of his 
act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it . . . . Intent 
is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows the consequences 
are certain or substantially certain to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the 
law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”) (emphasis added). See generally Brodin, 
The Role of Fault, supra note 166, at 975–85. 
 Derek Black argues the tort-based concept of intent should be imported generally into civil 
rights doctrine: 
When the defendant causes racially disparate results or harms, liability would be de-
termined by objective factors: whether the government was, or should have been, 
aware of the consequences of its actions; whether other less harmful reasonable alter-
natives were or are available; and whether there is any reason or competing interest 
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practices like Boston’s, used repeatedly with the same predictable exclu-
sionary results, as intentionally discriminatory.240 
Justice Stevens observed in 1976 regarding the use of the entry-level 
police officer exam in Washington v. Davis:  
  Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be ob-
jective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence 
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally[,] 
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of 
his deeds. [T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discrimi-
natory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as criti-
cal, as the reader of the Court’s opinion might assume. . . . [W]hen 
the disproportion is as dramatic as [here] it really does not matter 
whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect.241 
The District Court in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney242 invoked the 
same “presumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person in-
tends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions” in 
concluding that the absolute veterans’ preference for Massachusetts civil ser-
vice jobs constituted “intentional” and “purposeful” discrimination against 
women, given their historical exclusion from the military. 243 Although reject-
ing this conclusion on review, Justice Stewart conceded that it would be: 
[D]isingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legis-
lation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were not 
volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable. . . . Cer-
tainly, when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifia-
ble group are as inevitable as the gender-based consequences of 
                                                                                                                           
that dictates against implementing an available alternative. The final inquiry requires 
the defendant to justify its choice to perpetrate or continue a racial harm—in spite of 
available alternatives—with some purpose or interest that outweighs the harm. 
Derek Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, 
Results, & Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 325 (2008). “Indifference to consequences” is suffi-
cient to support an award of punitive damages in a § 1983 civil rights action. Smith v. Wade, 461 
U.S. 30, 43 (1983). A counterpart in criminal law is the doctrine of willful blindness. WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 186 (3d ed. 2017); LAURIE L. LEVINSON, THE GLAN-
NON GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW 31 (4th ed. 2015). 
 240 A funded study by the Police Executive Research Forum in Washington, D.C. recom-
mends that police executives periodically audit their agency’s selection processes to assess wheth-
er they have an adverse impact on minority applicants. LORIE FRIDELL ET AL., RACIALLY BIASED 
POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 73 (2001). 
 241 426 U.S. 229, 253–54 (1976). 
 242 442 U.S. 256, 235 (1979). 
 243 Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 147, 151 (D. Mass. 1978). 
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[the veterans’ preference], a strong inference that the adverse ef-
fects were desired can reasonably be drawn.244  
For dissenters Marshall and Brennan, the preference constituted intentional 
discrimination.245 
The Supreme Court has relied on the tort standard to find violations of 
equal protection on several occasions. In 1979 in Columbus Board of Edu-
cation v. Penick,246 a school de-segregation case, the Court ruled: 
[T]he District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseea-
ble and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to 
prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose. [Our] cases do not 
forbid “the foreseeable effects standard from being utilized as one 
of the several kinds of proofs from which an inference of segrega-
tive intent may be properly drawn.” Adherence to a particular pol-
icy or practice, “with full knowledge of the predictable effects of 
such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one 
factor among many others which may be considered by a court in 
determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be 
drawn.247 
And civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has long been read “against 
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural 
consequences of his actions.”248 
Incorporation of the presumption has in fact already occurred in Title 
VII contexts. In 2011, in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, for example, the Su-
preme Court described the circumstances under which an employer is liable 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278, 279 n.25. 
 245 Id. at 283–84 (Marshall J., dissenting).  
 246 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979). 
 247 Id.; see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9, 538 (1979) (noting 
that “proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of quite relevant evidence of racially discrimi-
natory purpose, and it may itself show a failure to fulfill the duty to eradicate the consequences of 
prior purposefully discriminatory conduct”); United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 
535–36 (8th Cir. 1975) (reversing the District Court because it failed to presume intent based on 
the “natural, probable and foreseeable consequences” of the defendant’s actions); Hart v. Cmty. 
School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1975) (inferring intent to segregate from the 
“foreseeable consequences of action taken [by the school board]”); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 
580, 588 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting that the “pattern of selective action and refusal to act can be seen 
as consistent only when considered against the foreseeable racial impact of such decisions”); Oli-
ver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting that a “presumption of 
segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural, probable, and foreseeable 
result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school seg-
regation”). 
 248 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1974); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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for the discriminatory acts of its supervisor by reference to whether the lat-
ter’s act was intended to cause adverse action against the plaintiff—which 
included the situation where the supervisor believed it was substantially 
certain to cause that result.249 
In 2011 in United States v. City of New York, U.S. District Judge Nich-
olas Garaufis held that New York City’s use of written firefighter exams 
constituted intentional discrimination because the demonstrable disparate 
impact and lack of meaningful job-relatedness should have been readily 
apparent. 250 Overseeing the latest in the “forty-year struggle to integrate the 
F.D.N.Y.,” which he described as “a stubborn bastion of white male privi-
lege,” 251 Judge Garaufis found: 
[T]he evidence in this case has established that the FDNY has not 
remained segregated-in-fact for over forty years by accident. In 
its opinions and findings of fact in this case, the court has exten-
sively detailed how policies, procedures, and practices adopted by 
the City of New York are responsible for systematically excluding 
black and Hispanic firefighter candidates from the ranks of the 
FDNY. The result of these actions—deliberately undertaken by 
the City of New York despite its officials’ knowledge of their dis-
criminatory effects—has been exactly the kind of systematic em-
ployment discrimination Congress intended to eradicate and pre-
vent when it passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
That this discrimination has been allowed to persist in New York 
City for so long is a shameful blight on the records of the six 
mayors of this City who failed to take responsibility for doing 
what was necessary to end it.252 
                                                                                                                           
 249 562 U.S. 411, 422 n.3 (2011). 
 250 No. 07-CV-2067 (NGG) (RLM), 2011 WL 4639832, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (City 
of New York II), vacated and remanded by 717 F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (City of New York III); 
see also United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (City of New 
York I) (finding that the use of the exams constituted a pattern and practice of intentional discrimi-
nation). Deeming the matter premature for summary judgment, the Second Circuit vacated and 
remanded for trial. City of New York III, 717 F.3d at 91. Judge Pooler dissented from the panel 
opinion in City of New York III because he found the persistent use of the exams to be evidence of 
discriminatory intent. Id. at 113 (Pooler, J., dissenting). Compare id. with Hearn v. City of Jack-
son, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 743 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that by using the re-
sults of a test that the City knew had a discriminatory impact, it had engaged in intentional dis-
crimination because the officials had reasonably misinterpreted the Justice Department’s com-
ments on the exam). 
 251 City of New York II, 2011 WL 4639832, at *1. The first decision striking down the exam 
was authored by Judge Weinfield in 1973. See Vulcan Soc’y v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of 
N.Y., 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that the exam was not valid). 
 252 City of New York II, 2011 WL 4639832, at *1. 
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Given “the numerous times the City has been sued for the same basic 
failure to design and administer civil service examinations that are job-
related and do not have a disparate impact upon minority groups,” the Dis-
trict Court concluded that “use of discriminatory testing procedures consti-
tuted a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against black fire-
fighter candidates.”253 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the 
issue of discriminatory intent on remand would focus on “whether the 
City’s use of the Exams, once their racially disparate impact was known, 
proves, in light of the history of low minority hiring, that the City used the 
Exams with the intent to discriminate.”254 
The F.D.N.Y. multiple-choice exam (like its counterparts in Boston and 
elsewhere) was the modus operandi for reserving for white men what was 
advertised as “the best job in the world.”255 The City had been “deliberately 
indifferent” to the racially exclusionary effects of the successive exams, and 
“had made conscious decisions to permit them to continue.”256 The relevant 
decision makers were long aware that the hiring practices discriminated 
against black applicants but “nonetheless refused to take steps to remedy 
this discrimination.”257 In a city with a black population of more than 25%, 
representation in the F.D.N.Y. was a mere 3.4%.258 
It is hard to imagine a more compelling case for the application of the 
tort presumption than a situation involving decades of similar-format exams 
with the same exclusionary results. The First Circuit Court of Appeals’ in-
troduction to Lopez (like Judge Young’s in Smith v. City of Boston noted 
above)—“There is no claim in this case that defendants intentionally select-
ed the test in order to disadvantage any group of applicants”259—is a func-
tion of an unduly cramped definition of “intent.”260 What is missing is the 
recognition that utilizing selection devices that inexorably exclude minori-
                                                                                                                           
 253 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
 254 City of New York III, 717 F.3d at 91. 
 255 City of New York II, 2011 WL 4639832, at *2. “Firefighters can’t be outsourced, and the 
benefits and pay are far more generous than at working-class jobs in the private sector, which have 
steadily declined over the past four decades.” GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 243 (quoting Steven 
Thrasher, Will the FDNY Remain Over 90 Percent White and Male?, VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 7, 
2012), https://www.villagevoice.com/2012/03/07/will-the-fdny-remain-over-90-percent-white-and-
male/ [https://perma.cc/3RB2-HDKK]. 
 256 GOLDBERG, supra note 21, at 310. 
 257 City of New York I, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 250. 
 258 City of New York II, 2011 WL 4639832, at *2. 
 259 Lopez II, 823 F.3d at 107. 
 260 The First Circuit appears to recognize only the most familiar form of intentional discrimi-
nation: “Rank ordering [based strictly on the multiple-choice exam] furthers the City’s interest in 
eliminating patronage and intentional racism under the guise of subjective selection criteria.” Id. 
at 119 (emphasis added). 
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ties cannot properly be said to be unintentional. Indeed, such conduct would 
be considered culpable as “knowing” under the Model Penal Code, where 
the actor “is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause 
such a result.”261 
Alternatively, a theory of “negligent discrimination”262 would hold the 
employer liable where it “fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent dis-
crimination that it knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or 
should expect to occur.”263 Employers would have an affirmative “duty to 
avoid harm” to minorities.264 “Even if the selection device meets the busi-
                                                                                                                           
 261 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 262 The term “negligent discrimination” was apparently coined by David Benjamin Oppen-
heimer in his classic article “Negligent Discrimination.” See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 
238. 
 263 Id. at 900. This includes situations where the employer continues to make employment 
decisions “that have a discriminatory effect, without first carefully examining its processes, [and] 
searching for less discriminatory alternatives.” Id. 
 264 Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 
STANFORD L. REV. 1381, 1403 (2014); see also Black, supra note 239, at 272–73. Ford states 
that: 
This would also constitute a shift in emphasis from reparative justice to deterrence; a 
shift away from a conception of fault and injury to a conception of conflicting ac-
tivities that entail joint costs; a shift away from the notion of objectively injurious 
actions to an idea of legally imposed duties of care that define legal injury; and a 
shift away from the goal of individual reparation to one of reducing the social costs 
of necessarily conflicting activities.  
Ford, supra, at 1386. 
 Ford uses Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), to illustrate how this approach 
would operate: 
[T]he crux of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ claim wasn’t really that Wal-Mart, as a corpora-
tion, had actively encouraged sex discrimination. It was that Wal-Mart hadn’t taken 
sufficient care to prevent it. Wal-Mart’s policies were vulnerable to sex discrimination 
by individual managers, but Wal-Mart did nothing to change the policies to reduce the 
risk of discrimination. Why not? Did Wal-Mart’s management secretly want its man-
agers to discriminate? There’s little evidence of such a motivation, and what’s more, 
there are obvious business justifications for Wal-Mart’s policies: in a service industry, 
subjective factors are relevant to job performance, but information about varying local 
conditions in such a large enterprise is costly to obtain and evaluate centrally. Decen-
tralized decision-making is an efficient way of organizing personnel decisions. To be 
sure, there will be mistakes—local prejudices and rogue managers who act on the basis 
of whim or bias—but these costs are probably outweighed by the benefits and savings 
of a decentralized and discretionary system. And there is the added benefit that a de-
centralized system effectively limits any liability for unlawful practices to the level of 
the individual store: if there is no centralized policy or decision-making apparatus, 
there is unlikely to be company-wide liability. 
. . . .  
In Wal-Mart’s case, there was a conflict between protecting women from sex dis-
crimination and employing its preferred personnel policies, which may well have 
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ness necessity test, if the employer knew or should have known of a less 
discriminatory device that met its legitimate needs, it should have avoided 
the harm caused to women and minorities [as well as the society as a whole] 
by using the less discriminatory device.”265 Otherwise the decision makers 
have been “deliberately indifferent” to the interests of the black applicants.266 
If a town were responsible for a traffic intersection where, because of 
obvious defects in design, serious accidents occurred with great frequency, 
and the town failed to remedy the defects, recovery for gross negligence or 
recklessness would likely follow. Yet public safety agencies have stifled the 
careers of minorities, as well as the potential to diversify ranks, while ignor-
ing alternative selection methods that are better able to identify competent 
supervisors. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company sought to “remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.”267 Successive use of job knowledge exams is one such 
stubborn barrier that has been allowed to persist by combination of “mini-
mal” validation and resistance to less discriminatory alternatives. 
This new approach would have significant benefits for enforcement of 
equal employment opportunity. First, liability would be extended to em-
ployers whose exclusionary personnel policies have persisted over time, but 
who have been able in court to isolate each device’s impact and avoid con-
fronting the cumulative effects of the pattern. Second, the range of available 
remedies would be expanded because victims of intentional discrimination 
(unlike those harmed by disparate impact) would be entitled to compensato-
ry and punitive damages.268 And affirmative relief, including preferential 
hiring or promotion, would be appropriate where the defendant has “inten-
tionally or egregiously engaged in a practice of discrimination that is likely 
to have discouraged members of the protected group from becoming mem-
                                                                                                                           
been desirable for other reasons, such as cost or ease of administration. Wal-Mart 
chose to retain the risky policies. 
Ford, supra, at 1387. 
 265 Oppenheimer, supra note 238, at 935. 
 266 City of New York I, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 264.  
 267 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971); see also Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s 
1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Recon-
struction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (1989); William T. Matlack, Note, Voluntary Public Employer 
Affirmative Action: Reconciling Title VII Consent Decrees with the Equal Protection Claims of Ma-
jority Employees, 28 B.C. L. REV. 1007, 1011–12 (1987) (noting the policy behind Title VII as ex-
pressed by the Court in Griggs). “Griggs was rightly concerned,” the Supreme Court later observed, 
“that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from 
forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citi-
zens for the remainder of their lives.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). 
 268 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012). 
2370 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2319 
bers of the applicant pool at any stage. [And where] the defendant’s dis-
crimination has been intentional, or there has been a long-continued pattern 
of egregious discrimination.”269 
Third, a liability finding entitles plaintiffs to attorneys’ fees, designed 
to encourage the crucial enterprise of private enforcement of Title VII.270 In 
a matter such as Lopez, plaintiffs’ counsel face the bleak prospect of a dec-
ade or more of enormously expensive and labor-intensive litigation, in an 
effort to persuade a federal district judge (perhaps reluctant to second-guess 
a public safety agency’s personnel decisions) to credit their experts over 
defendants’. And a rare victory at trial just takes the case into the long grind 
of the appellate process. 
A closely divided Supreme Court chastised the City of New Haven 
when it voluntarily took action to end a long streak of multiple-choice ex-
ams that had preserved a white firefighter supervisory force in a majority-
minority city. The Court in Ricci v. DeStefano found the City liable in a re-
verse-discrimination action when it discarded an exam that had eliminated 
virtually all minority candidates and was of dubious validity, ruling the ac-
tion constituted disparate treatment against the successful white test tak-
ers.271 One hopes the Court would take a more enlightened approach today, 
as it has regarding voluntary affirmative action in higher education.272 In 
any event, Title VII should provide redress against public safety employers 
who insist on recycling the misguided selection devices of the past. 
CONCLUSION 
“While a diverse police department does not guarantee a constitutional 
one, it is nonetheless critically important for law enforcement agencies . . . 
to strive for broad diversity among officers and civilian staff.”273 “Achiev-
ing diversity in entry level recruiting is important,” the Final Report of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing observed, “but achieving 
systematic and comprehensive diversification throughout each segment of 
the department is the ultimate goal . . . to help improve the culture of police 
                                                                                                                           
 269 City of New York II, 2011 WL 4639832, at *4. “Where an employer or union has engaged 
in particularly longstanding or egregious discrimination, an injunction simply reiterating Title 
VII’s prohibition against discrimination will often prove useless and will only result in endless 
enforcement litigation.” Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 
(1986). 
 270 Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 412 (1978) (noting that “the plaintiff 
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 271 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009). 
 272 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 273 FPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 26, at 89. 
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departments and build greater trust and legitimacy with all segments of the 
population.”274 The Report continued: 
  As our nation becomes more pluralistic and the scope of law 
enforcement’s responsibilities expands, the need for more and 
better training has become critical. Today’s line officers and lead-
ers must meet a wide variety of challenges including international 
terrorism, evolving technologies, rising immigration, changing 
laws, new cultural mores, and a growing mental health crisis. All 
states and territories and the District of Columbia should establish 
standards for hiring, training, and education. The skills and 
knowledge required to effectively deal with these issues requires 
a higher level of education as well as extensive and ongoing train-
ing in specific disciplines. The task force discussed these needs in 
depth, making recommendations for basic recruit and in-service 
training, as well as leadership development in a wide variety of 
areas: Community policing and problem-solving principles; inter-
personal and communication skills; bias awareness; scenario-
based, situational decision making; crisis intervention; procedural 
justice and impartial policing; mental health issues; analytical re-
search and technology; languages and cultural responsiveness.275 
All too often we read in the news about the tragic consequences of un-
representative police forces staffed by unskilled supervisors. Title VII is 
uniquely situated to address this problem, as it functions not only to address 
individual claims but also to assure fair treatment of racial groups by en-
compassing the “broad sweep of societal employment practices.”276 
Law enforcement agencies should not be free to indefinitely perpetuate 
their nearly all-white supervisory staffs by using “quasi-academic hur-
dles.”277 But the current doctrine regarding standardized testing has ham-
pered the statute’s potential by bogging it down in the arcane world of in-
dustrial psychology and psychometrics, thereby permitting these questiona-
ble devices to masquerade as color-blind selection tools.278 
                                                                                                                           
 274 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CEN-
TURY POLICING 16–17 (2015), http://elearning-courses.net/iacp/html/webinarResources/170926/
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In its sixth decade, Title VII has evolved and adapted to the changes in 
the workplace and the surrounding society.279 It was slow to embrace claims 
of sex harassment280 and sex stereotyping,281 but they are now routinely 
litigated. Courts should similarly now recognize the myriad of harms 
caused by the testing practices discussed here, and read Title VII to embrace 
claims against serial offenders who persist in the face of predictable exclu-
sionary outcomes. 
Over the decades, police departments like Boston’s have been able to 
bat down successive Title VII actions challenging tests that have little if 
anything to do with supervisory potential. When these employers know, as 
they do from their own experience and from what the experts tell them, that 
the exams will keep minorities out of the upper ranks, there must be mean-
ingful redress under Title VII for what is properly treated as intentional dis-
crimination. Otherwise we are not only abandoning the qualified minority 
officers denied career advancement, but risking continued tragic discord in 
the diverse communities that are served.  
                                                                                                                           
 279 As Catherine E. Smith has perceptively observed, the “evolving recognition of discrimina-
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